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ABSTRACT 
Between reactionaries and radicals a wide gulf 
exists in terms of political opinions. Within much 
narrower realms of conflict are the political issues which 
separate the body politic into contending groups. Within 
this narrower Ideological spectrum a survey of the Twenty-
Ninth Parliament of the Ontario Legislative Assembly was 
undertaken. This survey sought data on the attitudes of 
legislators towards various beliefs, interest groups, 
symbols and values. These efforts were made in order to 
test the existence of Ideological differences between the 
present political parties of Ontario. 
The responses to the ideological questions were 
manipulated to construct attltudinal patterns. The results 
of the various statistical tests showed that three major 
ideological patterns exist in Ontario politics. These 
patterns can be characterized as Tory, Whig and Socialist. 
Each attltudinal pattern is integrally associated with one 
political party. The Progressive Conservatives are pre-
dominantly Tories while Liberals are Whigs and New Democrats 
are Socialists. 
Efforts were made to explain the external features 
that influenced the particular attltudinal pattern a 
legislator adopted. The results of the study showed that 
Hi 
the attitudes of a legislator were affected dramaticalIv by 
the type of constituency he represented. However, the most 
important conclusion of the study Is that the present partv 
structure In Ontario Is Ideologically relevant. While 
parties display varying decrees of ideological cohesion the 
levels of cohesion are high enough for significant 
differences to exist between the attltudinal patterns of 
the parties. 
Iv 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONCERNS OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR 
Introduction 
Political science is a broad, multi-faceted 
discipline. One sub-discipline to evolve has been the 
study of legislative behavior. A cardinal assumption 
of this sub-discipline has been that the behavior of 
elected legislators can and oucrht to be explained. Few 
political scientists, if any, believe that the actions of 
participants in political struggles are totally random. 
To believe in the random theory of legislative behavior 
requires one to categorize politicians as "equivalent to 
the steel ball in a plnball game bumping passively from 
post to post down an inclined plane." If every 
legislator behaved in a random fashion then the actions 
of any group of legislators would be unpredictable and 
any trends that did emerge would be purely coincidental. 
Clearly, legislators do not behave in such a haphazard 
fashion. At a minimum, elected representatives are 
organized Into political parties and blocs which bring 
order to potentially chaotic situations. 
i 
Donald R. Matthews, Social Background of Political 
Peelsion-Makers (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 2. 
1 
2 
Early efforts in the study of legislative 
behavior soupht to describe particular phenomena, but 
offered little in the way of empirical verification and 
measurement. These initial studies set out to describe 
Informally various pressures constraining the behavior of 
the elected legislator. A legislator was thought to be 
loyal to and to be affected by: (l)his constituency, 
(2)his party or leadership, and (3)hls own ideals. 
Stuart A. Rice modified the framework by addlncr the 
element of 'scientific precision.* The studies that 
^lce undertook on legislative behavior, and particularly 
the inquiries into the influences exerted on legislators, 
were deslcned to construct crude empirical observations. 
At the time of their development in the 1920's, the Index 
of prroup 'cohesion' and the index of 'likeness* between 
PTOUPS were seen as the "most valuable as well as the 
most ingenious development of technique." Another 
influences related to constituency and party may 
be thought of as external Influences. The attitudes, 
biases, interests and predispositions of the individual 
legislator may be considered examples of Internal 
influences. Such variables have been singled out, often 
quite arbltrarially, as particularly significant in 
explaining legislative actions. The relationship between 
the internal and external influences will be explored 
throughout this study. 
2 
Herman Carey Beyle, Identification and Analysis 
of Attribute - Cluster - Blocs (New York: Johnson Reprint 
Corporation, 1970), o.~ 3. 
3 
resear-cher of the period, H. C. Beyle, set out to alter 
the pice methodology in t^ e ^ooe of obtaininf a technique 
for the "identification of significantly coherinp- blocs of 
Individuals within any crimen larsrer group and further 
identification and analysis of the clusters of discovered 
blocs."1 
In developing a methodology, both ^lce and Beyle 
chose the votlno* behavior of individual legislators as the 
unit of analysis. Such a choice constituted a sMft from 
formal, institutional analysis to a more informal -variation 
p 
of structural analysis. By empirically grouping 
legislators into significantly cohering voting blocs, 
Beyle moved t^e discipline toward the description and 
explanation of behavior patterns. Both the general 
approach and the specific techniques introduced by Rice 
and Beyle were later adopted by succeeding fenerations of 
investigators. In studies since the 1930's, political 
scientists have attempted to explain legislative 
behavior in terms of such variables as party identification, 
constituency characteristics, legislative role perceptions, 
and the personal attributes of the legislator. 
Beyle, op., clt., p. v. 
2 
For a more complete outline on this shift in 
approach see the introduction to Beyle, op. clt., PP. 
v - x. 
If 
T''e main focus of this thesis is the analysis of 
party solidarity in t^ e Ontat-io legislature. The study 
compares cohesion among parties and amonr issue-areas. 
The study looV? at the impact exerted on cohesion 
by leadership, by party loyalty, by constituencies, and 
bv personal ideals. Finally, the thesis explores 
""tlternative re-alismments that mlcht provide the 
legislature with a more "natural" division of its 
membership. 
This thesis is based on statistical techniques 
different from those employed in the vast majority of 
other studies. The next section of this chapter offers 
a critical evaluation of t>e more traditional techniques. 
T^e final section of this chapter presents an overview of 
the field of legislative behavior in order to permit a 
basis of comparison for the empirical findings revealed 
in subsequent chapters. 
The Techniques of Pice and Beyle 
John Grumm has identified five criteria by which 
1 
to evaluate techniques used in the analysis of blocs. 
These criteria are valid whether the objects of analysis 
are political parties, ideological blocs or any other 
^John C. Grumm, "The Systematic Analysis of Blocs 
in the Study of Legislative Behavior." Western Political 
Quarterly, XVII (196*0, pp. 350 - 362. 
5 
sub-prouos in a legislative body. There must be: 
(l)an objective means of defining the blocs in terms of 
their size, composition and purpose; (2)a process for 
discovering the structure of inter-relationships within 
the blocs; (3)a^0Sls for determining the cohesiveness of 
the bloc and and its relationship to other blocs; 
(4)a means of determining the sorts of issues that 
engender a group response, and; (5)a basis for analyzing 
the motivational factors involved in a bloc. It will be 
against this set of requirements that the techniques 
developed by Rice and Beyle will be evaluated. 
Rice proposed a technique for the evaluation of 
blocs know as the index of cohesion. Constructed from 
dlchotomous data, the cohesion index has been applied 
mainly to roll-call votes in legislatures,1 The method 
begins by selecting the members who are considered to form 
a bloc. As Rice admits, 
the existence of a group made up of certain pre-
determined individual members must be postulated 
before the tests of cohesion and likeness can be 
applied. The methods cited will not serve to 
determine automatically the effective groupings 
that actually exist within the body. 
•'•It is important to note that the index of cohesion 
could be applied to data other than roll-call data provided 
that this datamet the reauirement of being dlchotomous. 
2Stuart A. Rice, "The Identification of Blocs in 
Small Bodies," American Political Science Review, XXI 
(1927), P. 619. 
6 
This limitation has grave consequences. There can be no 
assurance that the blocs which are postulated are in fact 
the best possible combination. As Rice conceded his 
technique might "fail to discover the most cohesive 
groupings because of the lack of an objective empirical 
method for ascertaining the latter." The Inclusion in 
a bloc of even one member who should not have been 
considered can significantly alter the outcome of the 
test.2 
The index of cohesion is essentially a simple 
arithmetical calculation. If all members of a party or 
a bloc vote in the same manner, the index is 100. If 
three quarters vote one way the cohesion level is 50. 
If there Is an even split, the index is 0. The index of 
cohesion is found by subtracting the percentage of the 
group in the minority from the percentage that constitutes 
the majority.3 This calculation is made for each roll-
h, 
call vote and then an overall mean is computed. 
•'•Rice, op_. clt.., p. 620. 
2Thls possibility is openly admitted by Rice but 
he offers no solution for overcoming the difficulty. 
'See Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in 
Politics (New York: Knopf, 1928), Chapter l6. 
^Several authors have commented on the drawbacks 
present in this procedure. Duane Lockard believes that 
the index conceals the issue behind the roll-call. Some 
roll-call votes will be on matters of no consequence to 
the party while others might be considered crucial. A 
7 
When the Rice index of cohesion is used as a 
measure of group influence, without any form of statistical 
control of non-group factors, any vote split which is not 
an even fifty - fifty split is considered to be a function 
of the grotip's Influence on the legislative behavior. A 
further falling, or at least a potential failing, lies in 
the assumption of what the group position is. Rice defines 
the group position as the position taken by the majority. 
however it is possible that the group position might 
2 
actually be supported by half the group or less. 
standard application of the index will not distinguish 
between Importance of issues. See Duane Lockard, 
"Legislative Politics in Conneticut," American Political 
Science Review, XLVII (1954), 166 - 173. Criticism of 
this type prompted Duncan MacRae to conclude that bloc 
analysis is best suited to a "situation in which groups 
of legislators form genuine coalitions voting on measures 
as a matter of consultation or strategy rather than in 
terms of underlying attitudes." See Duncan MacRae, The 
Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study 
of the Tfouse of Representatives in the Eighty-First 
Congress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 
p. 303. By averaging scores on various roll-calls without 
reference to their content the index finds legislators who 
vote alike, but do not necessarily hold the same attitudes. 
If there really are several different underlying dimensions 
of choice, eac\ of *Thioii determines the vote in a particular 
subset of roll-calls, bloc analysis will obscure this. 
*Aage R. Clausen, "The Measurement of Legislative 
Group Behavior," Midwest Journal of Politics, XI (1967), 
p. 214. 
P 
"~Ibld. For example the leadership of the group 
might adopt a policy at odds with majority feeling in the 
party, bloc or whatever unit is under analysis. In 
addition a definitive policy statement or a government 
decision might be taken as evidence of the "true" group 
oosition. 
3 
Once the index of cohesion has been determined, 
the second of Rice's twin techniques is calculated. The 
proposed "index of likeness" is computed "as the complement 
of the difference in the Proportion of two groups voting 
in a given direction." An index is computed for each 
roll-call and then averaged. The index of likeness has 
many of the weaknesses exhibited by the index of cohesion. 
It Is important to note here that the index of likeness 
can only score two groups at a time. When more than tvro 
groups are tested, the resulting index of likeness scores 
are not comparable.2 
In addition to providing these measures for the 
evaluation of group coheslveness, Rice outlined a 
procedure to compute blocs. This method begins by 
calculating the percentage of times that each legislator 
votes in agreement with each of the other legislators. 
The agreement percentages for all possible pairs of 
legislators are then listed in a table in order of their 
magnitude. Once the table has been completed a cut-off 
^Clausen, on. clt., p. 221. If the same proportion 
of each group votes in an identical manner the difference 
in proportion is 0. The score for the Index of likeness 
is the proportional complement, 100. 
p 
For example if Bloc A has an index of likeness 
score of 80 with Bloc B and Bloc C, no statement could 
be made about the relationship between Blocs B and C 
because both Blocs mav not hold the same issues in common 
with A. 
9 
point has to be set to signify which agreements are 
significant enough to constitute a bloc. Rice arbitrarily 
set this cut-off point at eighty per cent of agreement. 
The minimum size of each bloc must also be predetermined. 
On Intuitive grounds, Rice set the minimum membership 
size at four. Those pairs that do not show agreement 
scores of eighty per cent or greater are excluded from 
consideration. Individuals xvho not have agreement scores 
of eighty per cent with at least three other legislators 
2 
are also drcpoed from consideration. The legislators 
left in consideration are divided into blocs on the basis 
of the issues selected. 
*Beyle goes to great lengths to point out the 
drawback of such a procedure. For example, in a study 
of the Minnesota legislature In the 1930's the problem 
of detecting blocs of members would involve identifying 
the significant blocs among 147,573,952,534,561,764,882 
possible combinations composed of from three to sixty-
four members each. Basically Beyle saw the difficulty 
with the Rice methodolgoy as an outgrowth of the enormous 
number of possible combinations among the members of even 
a small legislative body. The number of combinations 
increases geometrically with increases in the absolute 
size of the legislative body. See Bevle, op. clt., p. 5. 
p 
"This latter step may have to be iterated several 
times because, as individuals are eliminated, other 
individuals with whom they have been paired might fall 
below the criterion that they must have eighty percent 
agreement scores with at least three individuals. The 
process of elimination may mean that a substantial 
proportion of the legislators will remain unclassified. 
As a result, the makeup of the blocs that do emerge can 
be highly misleading or artificial. A conscious effort 
could be made to include more legislators in the blocs 
by either reducing the minimum size of blocs or by lowering 
the agreement level to a percentage less than eighty. Both 
of these changes would be highly arbitrary and difficult 
to justify. 
10 
Unfortunately, any application of the method is 
exceedingly laborious. As Rice acknowledged, 
Application of the technique Is not practicable in 
bodies exceeding 25 or 30 in membership because of 
the inordinate amount of labour which the tabulation 
and computation would involve.1 
An additional problem with the technique concerns the 
inflationary effects on index scores caused by the 
presence of unanimous or near-unanimous voting splits 
2 
in the data. 
Beyle developed an alternative technique based 
on more objective criteria. Instead of a simple 
percentage of agreement, Beyle formulated "an index of 
significant cohesion of pairs." Beyle assumed that the 
probability of two legislators agreeing on either side 
of an issue was fifty percent. However, the probability 
of agreeing on a given side of the issue was only half that 
amount. Therefore zero cohesion was defined as twenty-
five percent agreement or less. Beyle then proceded to 
transform the percentages between twenty-five and one 
hundred into a range from zero to one hundred. 
•^Rlce, "The Identification of Blocs in Small 
Political Bodies," p. 627. 
p 
"The effects of near-unanimous agreements on the 
Rice indices and method of bloc calculation are outlined 
by Hugh L. Leblance, "Voting in a State Senate: Party and 
Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political 
Science. XIII (1969), p. 35. 
11 
"Beyle's other modification was to place the 
indices in a matrix so that one could readily ascertain 
the most cohesive pair. This cohesive pair would serve 
as the nucleus of the bloc. Members with high scores 
of agreement with the original pair would be added. This 
expansion procedure continues until it is possible to 
identify an "inner-core," "Inner fringe," and "outer 
fringe." Once the first bloc has been identified, 
then the most cohesive of the remaining pairs is 
isolated to form the nucleus of the second bloc. This 
process could continue indefinitely. The expansion 
procedure could result in some degree of overlapping, by 
which a legislator is Included In more than one group. 
In addition, a number of legislators might fail to be 
classified in any bloc." 
Since the Beyle method of bloc construction is 
basically a modification of the Rice technique, it 
shares many of the shortcomings already enumerated In 
the evaluation of the Rice methodology. Neither technique 
Unlike Rice, Beyle did not use a predetermined 
cut-off point for levels of cohesion. Instead Beyle 
searched for natural breaks in the data. As a result, 
the minimum level of cohesion required to be a member of 
a bloc was variable depending upon the circumstances of 
the study. 
2 
For a rare application of Beyle's technique, see 
David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study. 
Truman used raw agreement scores. Hence it appears that 
the Beyle method can be used satisfactorily without all 
the complex statistical paraphernalia associated with 
the index of significant cohesion of pairs. 
12 
provides a solution that Involves no subjective Judgement.1 
The arbitrariness of Rice's cut-off points is more obvious 
than the subjective decisions required with the Beyle 
technique. Nevertheless, by setting down relatively few 
p 
guidelines Beyle left his technique open to gross misuse. 
Both techniques fail to reveal the structure of relationships 
within the blocs. The two procedures may conceivably 
allocate a nuclear position to legislators who are actually 
on the fringe of the bloc. By allowing certain legislators 
to be excluded from blocs the techniques tend to distort 
the actual relationships that are present. 
Rice and Beyle offer statistical measures to 
gauge the cohesion of the groups. The reliability of 
these statistics Is questionable because of the inflationary 
Grumm reviews the Beyle method and concludes 
that despite Its statistical precision the method did 
not provide an explicit procedure for assigning members 
to a bloc or for drawing the limits of the bloc. One 
cannot tell whther to give priority In constructing a 
cluster to the Individual who has a very high agreement 
score with only a few members of the cluster nucleus or 
to the person having somewhat lower scores with a larger 
number of cluster members. Thus it would be possible 
under the Beyle method to identify as the nucleus of a 
bloc legislators who in fact exceeded the norms of the 
group. See Grumm, oj>. clt., p. 352. 
2With no cut-off guidelines Beyle opens up 
the possibility that researchers will use those guide-
lines that best suit their own purposes. However, 
this does not mean that the criteria for cut-off points 
be as rigid as those proposed by Rice. 
13 
effects of near-unanimous votes, because of distortion 
caused by averaging a number of indices, and because of 
the method used in the selection of issues. Bloc 
analysis techniques ought to Isolate those issues "most 
likely to engender a bloc response." Neither the Rice 
nor the Beyle techniques allows for the easy Identification 
of such issues since both techniques attribute equal 
weight to each Issue. In other words, Important Issues 
are treated the same as trivial matters. 
The clustering process should allow for Inferences 
to be made regarding the motivational factors involved In 
2 bloc behavior. The procedures outlined by Rice and 
Beyle produce blocs upon which further motivational 
studies can be carried out. However, if the groups 
produced by this method are misleading or distorted 
then the inferences about motivational factors will also 
be misleading or distorted. 
The Studies of Blocs and Parties 
The last twenty years have witnessed a number 
of significant studies analyzing the solidarity of parties 
Grumm, op., clt.. p. 362. 
2Little has been said thus far regarding this 
criterion for it assumes that the blocs arrived at under 
the previous four criteria are valid blocs. 
14 
and blocs. Almost all of these studies originated in the 
United States with the result that the data is usually 
drawn from roll-call votes in either the Congress or state 
legislatures. Many of these studies utilized the indices 
fromulated by Rice. 
The studies to be cited in this section make one 
underlying assumption about the relationship between 
votes cast on bills and the ideological beliefs of the 
legislator.2 David B. Truman observes, 
Roll-call votes ... have the great advantage of 
being 'hard' data. Like statistics on elections, 
they represent discrete acts the fact of whose 
occurence is not subject to dispute.3 
As a result, the roll-call is often taken to be a concrete 
expression of a legislator's ideological beliefs. Issues 
to which ideological significance is attached will find 
1Uo Canadian study could be found that dealt 
specifically, in an empirical fashion, with the issue of 
cohesion among both parties and blocs. Leon Epstein dealt 
with the cohesion of parties in the Canadian !i*ouse of 
Commons by basing his study on the recorded votes of 
that legislative body. See Leon Epstein, "A Comparative 
Study of Canadian Parties," American Political Science 
Review, LVIII (1964), pp. 46 - ~6~0~. The Epstein study did 
not attempt to consider ideological cohesion or the 
presence of blocs. 
2 
Once again it is necessary to reiterate the failings 
present in the use of roll-call votes to construct the 
indices fromulated by Rice. Issues vary in importance. 
A difficulty arises when attempting to weight the issues 
to correspond to their relative importance due to the 
extremely subjective nature of the task. 
3Julius Turner, Party and Constltutency: Pressures 
on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hooklns Press, 1951). p. 12. 
15 
the blocs aliened against each other. It is uosslble 
I hat roll-call votes can reflect more than ideological 
beliefs. The interests of parties, regional factions, 
and denoiTaohic blocs can be established by analyzing 
t^ e voting patterns of a legislature's membership. 
Issues to which partisan, factional or demographic 
.-significance are attached will find t^ e various groups 
arrayed in positions opposed to each other. As a result 
roll-call votes can be used to test the existence of a 
i 
number of diverse cleavages within a legislative bodv. 
Once tNe data has been obtained from the roll-
call votes, the researcher must still determine whether 
1
 e will analyze the problem from the viewpoint of the 
individual legislator or the group. If attention is 
focused on the individual, the legislator's votes become 
the object of analysis. On the other hand, if the studv 
is approached from the Perspective of the group the vote 
division of the group becomes the object of analysis. 
xMalcolm E. Jewell and Samuel ~. Patterson 
set forth the ilea that the level of cohesion varies 
with the type of issue. If this belief is true then 
a researcher using certain actual and specific issues 
can distort the results of an allocation of legislators 
to hypothetical blocs. Thus it may not be possible to 
extrapolate the results of roll-call votes into representing 
the ideological beliefs of a legislator. Jewell and 
Patterson cite an example of how various types of Issues 
effect party cohesion. See Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel 
G. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States 
(!?ew York: Rancfom House, 1966), p. "^ 30"." 
16 
At the individual legislator level a measure of 
individual behavior involves a comparison of one 
person's \/ote with another in order to determine the 
consistency with which individual differences and 
similarities appear. In measures of group behavior, 
the focus is on the conformity of the group members* 
T,otes to an operationally defined group position.1 
The individual-oroup distinction may not be as clear as 
this quotation would have it appear, but nevertheless 
the distinction prevades all the studies and thus each 
study can be categorized as either belonging to the 
group or individual approach. The hypotheses tested by 
each category of study reflect the differences in 
a pproach. 
At the individual level of analysis, efforts 
have been concentrated on explaining variations in 
legislators1 attitudes and behavior through differences 
in social and political characteristics of legislators 
and demographic features of their constituencies. 
Freauently this has been achieved by cross-tabulating 
the demographic characteristics of legislators and their 
districts with the legislators attitudes and behavior. 
Much of the literature explores the effects exerted 
by constituency variables on the attitudes of legislators. 
Kornberg, for example, argues that there is a direct 
connection between socio-economic interests in 
constituencies and legislative attitudes. Legislators 
•^ Clausen, OP. clt., p. 212. 
17 
do not wish to risk electoral defeat by alienating these 
interests. It is possible to make an assumption that 
similar constituency interests comprise comparable 
socio-economic environments. As a result legislators who 
are exposed to the same constituency Interests would tend 
2 to hold similar attitudes. By this line of reasoning, 
Ideological blocs are a reflection of the demographic 
cleavages that exist between constituencies.^ 
A diversity of interests would indicate a 
heterogeneous constituency. With no dominant interst 
upon which to construct an electoral strategy it would 
be increasingly difficult to maintain a successful 
coalition. Thus one hypotheis that has been advanced 
is that a competitive electoral district tends to be 
heterogeneous in terms of demographic characteristics. 
xAllan Kornberg, "Perception and Constituency 
Influence on Legislative Behavior." Western Political 
Quarterly. XIX (1966), p. 226. 
2 
Louis A. Froman, Congressmen and Their 
Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963V. p. 11. 
^The reasoning behind this hypothesis Is that 
political parties aim their electoral appeal at 
particular interests present in the electorate and that 
the parties will then reflect these interests in the 
ideology that they adopt. In short it would mean that 
political parties would become synonymous with ideological 
blocs. 
Froman, op., clt.. p. 11. 
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The more competitive the constituency, the greater the 
likelihood of the legislator deviating from the 
established ideological position of the party. In a 
similar vien, it has been hypothesized that deviation 
from the party's ideological norms is greatest among 
members whose districts are atypical of the party and 
2 
most like that of the opposition party. " Heinz Eulau 
presents the view that legislators from competitive 
ridings, which also tend to be atypical constituencies, 
are more dependent on their party's support than legislators 
coming from one-party areas. To Eulau,partisanship 
would seem to be more salient in competitive electoral 
districts than in others.-' 
^Froman, op. clt., PP. 113 - 114. Froman reasoned 
that competitive constituencies, because of their greater 
heterogenity, would more likely produce situations where 
the Interests of the party conflicted with the riding's 
interests. With a close margin of victory a legislator 
would be more likely to heed the constituency than a 
member for a safe seat. See also Thomas A. Flinn, "Party 
Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," 
American Political Science Review, LVIII (1964), pp. 60 -
71. Flinn concluded that electoral margin had little to 
do with loyalty to partv, except that the least secure 
members of the legislature, i.e. the members of the winning 
party with the lowest pluralities, were less loyal to the 
party than other members. 
2 
Duncan MacRae, "The Relation Between Roll Call 
1?,otes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts lTouse of 
Representatives," American Political Science Review, 
XLT'I (1952), P. 200. 
Ajohn C. Wahlke, and Heinz Eulau, e d s . , L e g i s l a t i v e 
3ehav lo r ( " l encoe : Free P r e s s , 1959) , p . 344. 
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The studies that have approached legislative 
behavior by way of an analysis of the individual have 
tended to rely heavily on social background or behavior, 
rather than upon Intervening attitudes. Such studies 
tend to be descriptive and give little more than body 
counts on the selected variables. Examples of this type 
of study include Julander's examination of the Utah State 
legislature,1 Ross* study of parliamentary representation,2 
Pisciotte and HJelm's analysis of Colorado legislators,3 
and Prewitt and Nowlan's efforts to explain the behavior 
of incumbent politicians.^ Two recent studies of 
Canadian provincial legislatures fall into the same 
category. However, the analysis of Saskatechewan 
M.L.A.'s by David Smith* and the study of recruitment 
patterns to the Ontario Legislative Assembly by 
i 
^Rodney Julander, "The Composition and Voting 
Record of the Utah State Legislature, 1957 - 1963," 
Western Political Quarterly. XVII (1964), 88 - 90 
(Supple. T~. 
2 
J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation 
2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949). 
^Joseph P. Pisciotte, and Victor Hjelm, "Profile 
and Careers of Colorado State Legislators," Western 
Political Quarterly. XXI (1968), 698 - 722. 
^Kenneth Prewitt, and William Nowlan, "Political 
Ambitions and Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," Western 
Political Quarterly. XXII (1969), 298 - 308. 
^David E. Smith, "The Recruitment, Role Perceptions 
and Political Attitudes of Saskatchewan M.L.A.'s," Canadian 
Political Science Association. Annual Meeting, 1970. 
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Robert Williams1 fail to utilize fully the statistical 
techniques at their disposal. At best only bivariate 
operations were employed, the most common of which was 
cross-tabulation. 
Studies employing the individual member approach 
are particularly susceptiable to becoming 'body count' 
endeavours. Simple empiricism is no substitute for 
conceptual clarification. To be meaningful, empirical 
studies must present research findings in a theoretically, 
or at least conceptually, viable framework. This framework 
must give more than ad hoc significance to the great 
2 
variety of factors that make up the legislative process. 
The adoption of the individual approach does not entirely 
preolude potentially significant findings. Rather, it 
may be that studies applying the group approach have 
looked at phenomena which lend themselves to more 
theoretical statements.-' 
•^Robert J. Williams, "Recruitment to the Ontario 
Legislature," Canadian Political Science Association. 
Annual Meeting, 1971. 
2Wahlke and Eulau, op_. clt., p. 355. 
^One must be careful not to confuse more 
sophisticated techniques as evidence of a theoretically 
sound framework. "Brute empiricism no matter how 
elegant or rigorous in design, if it is unenlightened 
by theory it adds little to our understanding of 
legislative behavior and the legislative process." 
Wahlke and Eulau, pj>. clt.. p. 355» 
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The one feature of the group approach to 
legislative behavior that makes such studies worthwlle 
is that the studies assume the existence of conflicting 
pressures on party o^ bloc members. Legislators are 
faced with conflicting pressures and must try to balance 
these pressures. Thus instead of being tied to the 
will of the constituency or party the legislator may 
in fact be "more free than others to exercise independent 
judgement." If any decision made by the legislator is 
likely to bring both praise and condemnation then he may 
be able to base his decisions more on his own beliefs 
than the dictates of party or constituency." If 
bifurcations are discovered in the behavior and attitudes 
of legislators from constituencies with different 
characteristics these bifurcations may indicate the 
presence of constituency pressures. 
In an analysis of constituency pressures, Julius 
Turner concluded that members from similar districts, 
and thus by inference subject to the same pressures, 
Turner, op,, cit., p. 165. 
p 
"In describing the conflicting pressures of party 
and constituency that a legislator faces it must be 
remembered that in relation to many of the issues the 
constituencies have no clear interests. Constitutency 
interests are most likely to appear on broad social 
and economic Issues. 
'Turner, op. clt.. p. 21. 
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i 
tend to behave in the same way regardless of party ties. 
The opposite point of view is taken by Thomas Flinn. 
Plinn maintains that the situation is clear that, 
members from similar constituencies do not vote 
in the same way and that differences between parties 
are not due to differences in the composition of 
the legislative parties In terms of constituencies 
represented.2 
Conflicting findings, similar to the Flinn - Truman 
disagreement, are not uncommon in this particualr branch 
of legislative behavior. For every study which posits a 
given relationship it is possible to cite another study 
to disclaim that hypothesis. 
Discrepancies of this kind can be accounted for in 
several ways. First of all, most of the studies used 
roll-call votes as their source of data and various 
aspects of the Rice and Beyle techniques to manipulate 
the data. As a result the possibility exists that 
distortions would manifest themselves in Individual 
studies. Secondly, almost all of the studies analyzed 
only one legislative body, be it a state legislature 
or Congress, and usually for a time period of only one 
•'•See Wayne W, Shannon, Party, Constituency and 
Congressional Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1968), p0 19. "Democrats with 
constituencies similar in terms of urban - rural makeup 
to those of regular Republicans at any time were more 
likely to vote like the latter than their colleagues and 
vice versa." 
p 
Flinn, op_. clt., p. 63. 
23 
o^ two sessions. Such cases provide no scientific basis 
for generalizing about the universe of legislative 
bodies from which the case is drawn. The validity of 
tve various hypotheses is not going to be established 
or- riisconfirmed by a single study. The best one can 
Viooe for is that with further refinements of technique, 
p-ene-rel trends concerning the variables will emerge 
with the passape of time and the application of the 
hypotheses to a number of jurisdictions and legislative 
bodies. The fact that to date there has been little demonstrated 
agreement on the relationship between legislator, party 
and constituency should not be construed as evidence that 
patterns of relationship are non-existent. Therefore 
t?e hypotheses concerninr these relationships will 
continue to be outlined in the light of this note of 
caution. 
One important aspect of constituency influence 
relates to the urban - rural split. From his analysis of 
Kansas legislators, Grumm concludes that in rural 
dominated parties it is not surprising that legislators 
from a more urban settinr "only loosely attach themselves 
i 
Turner, op. clt., p. 11. The ability to make 
comparisons between legislators and parties reduced 
this limitation but does not eliminate it. The study 
of one legislature may not permit the drawing of general 
conclusions but does allow for the forming of possible 
trends. 
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to the bulk of the party." By contrast Turner argues 
that the mere fact a legislator represents a large 
city may not be enough to cause him to vote with other 
members from large cities. Most large cities have 
certain characteristics In common, such as high 
concentrations of foreign-born Inhabitants, Roman Catholics 
and industrial workers. To some extent urban - rural 
differences may be masking conflicts based on nationality, 
p 
religion and economic status. 
In cases where the Interests of party and 
constituency are not Identical, the legislator has pressure 
3 
exerted on him to deviate from the party position. There-
fore when the constituencies are homogeneous for a party 
there is: 
maximum of opportunity for agreement on issues 
within each party and a minimum of likelihood 
that legislators will be torn between loyalty 
to the legislative party and loyalty to the 
constituency.^" 
1Grumm, op. clt.. p. 36l. 
p 
^Turner, op., clt. , p. 73. The demographic 
difference are reflected in the problems which arise in 
urban and rural communities and in the means by which 
these problems are handled. 
MacRae, op., clt. . p. 1046. The electoral margin in 
the last election may sensitize a legislator to behave 
differently from representatives of similar constituencies. 
4 Jewell and Patterson, op., clt., p. 423. 
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In a similar way, Truman believes that lntra-party 
differences in attitudes can be explained by lntra-party 
differences in the nature of constituencies. 
Among possible differences in the demographic 
character of constituencies, the urban-rural cleavage has 
received considerable attention. Shannon and Jewll and 
Patterson argue that the urban-rural dichotomy is a crucial 
i 
predictor of legislative attitudes and behavior. Flinn 
also believes that different levels of urbanization among 
constituencies help to explain legislators* attitudes, but 
he attaches somewhat less importance to the variable than 
9 
the preceding observers." 
Another structural influence on the attitudes of 
legislators may arise from the relative size of their 
parties. As parties become larger, there is an increase 
in the number of interests represented by the members, an 
increase in the number of potential conflicts, and an 
increase in internal dissension. In one form or another, 
this basic hypothesis is accepted by most researchers.-^ 
1Shannon, op., clt., p. 115. Jewell and Patterson, 
op. clt., p. 423. 
2Flinn, op., clt.. p. 63. 
-^ One of the researchers that does disagree is Hugh 
LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: Party and Constituency 
Influences," Midwest Journal of Political Selene. XII 
(1969), P. 37. LeBlanc's position is supported by Sorauf, 
op. clt., p. 137 and Jewell and Patterson, pp. filfr.. P. 422. 
2 6 
In the extreme case of one-party dominated 
legislatures, it Is possible that the party ceases to be a 
unit of behavioral analysis. The party may become such 
a conglomeration of conflicting views and interests that 
the party exists only In name. Conversely a dominant party 
may not feel threatened by the opposition and thus may 
tolerate substantial deviation. The opposition parties may 
be driven either to a unified resistance or they may 
see little point in trying to maintain a high degree 
p 
of cohesion. Generally, the majority party tends to be 
less cohesive than the minority parties.3 
When there is less than total agreement within a 
party on ideological issues, attention can be focused on 
alternate groupings of members. These groupings need 
not be formal structures like parties. Instead it is 
possible, under these circumstances, to cluster members 
into blocs on the basis of their attltudinal patterns. 
A legislator is not required to use the bloc as a 
reference point. In fact the legislator may not be aware 
Sorauf, op., pit.. p. 137. 
2 
Jewell and Patterson, OJD. clt.. p. 422. 
3MacRae, "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes 
and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives," p. 1049. 
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that he holds views in common with other members of the 
legislature. Since ideological blocs may be considered 
potential parties, these groupings represent a possibility 
for more effective parties in the legislative system. 
Attention can be can be focused on the cohesion exhibited 
by political parties and on the best ideological alternatives 
p 
to the present party structures. 
Rice, Farmers and Workers. p. 24. 
2 
It may be noted that the review of the present 
relevant literature on legislative behavior contains few 
references to studies of parliamentary institutions. 
Studies of parlaimentary systems have tended to define 
cohesion in terms of party discipline rather than ideology. 
In addition most studies of parliamentary bodies and 
parties are not of an empirical nature. As a result 
this study has placed heavy reliance on American 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE DATA BASE 
Unique Feature of the Ontario Structure 
The legislature of the Province of Ontario is a 
responsible legislative body. This means that the executive 
is answerable to, and part of, the legislative body. 
According to parliamentary tradition, the government is 
formed by the leader of the party possessing the support 
of the legislature. Since the survival of the executive 
depends upon the continued backing of the legislature, 
party discipline is strictly enforced by both the govern-
ment and opposition parties. However, so long as basic 
party interests are not threatened an occasional deviation 
from the party line may be tolerated. Generally, the 
attitudes of individual members are expected to yield 
when in conflict with the views of their party. As a 
result, most of the recorded votes on legislation brought 
before the legislature show the parties to be voting as 
units. 
Although Canadian roll-call data can be used as 
evidence that Canadian parties are disciplined, the data 
do not necessarily show that they are highly cohesive. 
In the United States the separation of the legislative 
and executive branches removes a major incentive for 
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party discipline. The recorded votes of legislators 
in t1-ie United Jtates may reflect the Ideological or 
constituency orientations of each legislator. It is 
therefore at least partially valid for American studies 
to test the cohesion of parties using roll-call votes 
as their source of data. Anv application of such 
a procedure to a Canadian legislature would test 
the extent- of oarty discipline rather than partv 
co^esion. L 
If t-e ffects of constituency variables and 
'attitude orientations are to be measured in Canada, 
t' en a substitute for recorded votes must be found. 
Toe only feasible alternative is to conduct a survey 
of legislators to determine their attitudes, their 
personal characteristics, and the demorraphic features 
of t^eir constituencies. It is through this procedure 
tv,at a truly meanin -ful definition of partv cohesion 
can be tested. 
1Leon Epstein believes that the cohesiveneso 
of Canadian parties on both provincial and federal 
levels Is undisputed despite the fact tnat there have 
been "no definitive roll-call studies to establish the 
degree of parliamentary cohesion..." See Leon Eosteln, 
"A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," American 
Political Science Review, K-'II (1964), p. 52"."" To" 
apply the roll-call procedure and such a definition of 
cohesion to the Canadian political setting onlv makes a 
mockery of tne American assumption t>at beliefs and 
constituency variables affect legislative v-otinp behavior. 
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Th_^  Data. 
The data used in this study were obtained through 
a questionnaire distributed to all members of t'^ e 
Legislative Assemblv.1 Part of the survey was designed 
ro measure the attitudes v>eld by legislators. ^ome 
meanorenent of attitudes was necessary if the ideological 
orientation of members was to be determined. The dilemma 
was whether to choose a larre number of attitude areas 
with a fe-r Questions in esc'1 field or to choose a few 
restricted areas of interest and apply a series of 
Questions. In selecting 1"'1» first option, the researcher 
must weip'- the advantage of being able to examine a 
relatively lar "e number of attitudes without overburdening 
2 the respondent vrith the disadvantage of reduced reliability. 
The second alternative offers the advantage of highly 
reliable results for each attitude field selected, but 
in order to keep the number of questions within reasonable 
bound only a small number of attitudes could be investigated. 
-'•The data were collectad under the auspices of 
the Ontario Legislative Project, Waterloo Lutheran 
University. For helping to make the data available, I 
would like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Conrad 
Vinn, Director of the Project, and Dr. John Redekop, 
Chairman of the Political Science Department. 
p 
There must be enough question of a sufficiently 
general nature that a researcher covering the same areas 
of interest, but not employing the same questions, would 
obtain compatible results. For a brief explanation of the 
concept of reliability see "ubert M. Blalock, Social 
statistics (New York: Mc^raw - Hill, 1972), p. 12. 
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It is doubtful that the additional reliability brought 
about by the xxse of the second alternative would 
compensate for having only a limited number of attitudes. 
In the construction of attltudinal patterns additional 
weight is intuitively given to the presence of a large 
number of attitudes. Conseauentlv the survey was 
constructed to conform to the first alternative. In 
this way, the survey included a relatively large number 
of attitude areas with a few key question to represent 
each field. 
Attitudes are dispositions to act. Therefore, 
attitudes can not be directly observed. As hypothetical 
constructs, attitudes must be linked with antecedent 
conditions and consequent behavior if thev are to 
be fully understood. The holding of a certain set 
of attitudes is necessary but not sufficient to bring 
2 
about a particular type of action. An analysis of 
attltudinal patterns can not be expected to yield a 
perfect method for predictinc the behavior of legislators. 
The addition of questions relating to the personal 
characteristics of the legislators and the demographic 
and electoral features of tve constituencies enhances 
-'•This problem of survey construction is looked at 
by Hans J. Sysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19 5^. PO.T43 - 144. 
2Ibld., p. 265. 
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the validity of the results obtained through analysis 
of attitudes. 
Questions on attitudes constitute the dependent 
variables in the inquiry. Efforts have been made to 
have these questions conform to the standards of content 
that are acceptable throughout the discipline. For many 
of the same reasons, the independent variables used to 
explain the dependent variables are the indicators that 
have become established in the discipline through 
continuous application. However, there must not be so 
many indicators that the complexity of the schema Impairs 
its interpretation or applicability or so few that a 
substantial portion of the deoendent variable's variance 
is left unexplained. As a result only one Indicator has 
been chosen to represent each demographic characteristic. 
For example, instead of asking for a breakdown of the 
major religions present in a riding, respondents were 
asked to provide only the percentage of constituents who 
were Roman Catholic. If necessary, the percentage of 
Protestants could be inferred from the information 
supplied. Usually the portion of Protestants is the 
complement of the portion of Roman Catholics. Thus the 
presence of two questions would only prove redundant. 
i 
-"•This problem is tackled by Robert Drummond, 
"Multivariate Analysis of Party Choice in Ontario," 
Canadian Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, I 
1970. 
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In questions aimed at eliciting the attitudes 
of legislators there can be no objective measure. 
This is particularly significant in a study aiming to 
explain the political orientations of legislators. 
Questions are constructed to measure a member's attitude in 
a given field, and these questions must be of a nature that 
is acceptable to other investigators. For this reason, 
questions on specific legislative proposals have been 
kent to a minimum and an effort has been made to include 
questions which have a general applicability. General 
questions have the advantage of providing data relating 
to the attitudes of legislators with a minimum of chance 
that the response has been affected by the policy stance 
of the legislator's party. In other words general 
questions limit the influence of external factors and 
allow the legislator's beliefs to be more fully expressed. 
The last major consideration taken into account 
deals with the form in which the values of the variables 
are expressed. The variables which are employed in the 
survey must provide results in a form which is amenable 
to the statistical techniques that will be used in testing 
the data. Without elaborating on the actual statistical 
procedures, let it suffice to state that a variety of 
multi-variate techniques will be applied. Multl-variate 
techniques require variables consisting of intervally 
scaled data. As a result, most variables were constructed 
to yield Interval, or at least ordinal data. 
Traditional Indicators such as education and 
class were operationallzed In a form that allowed them 
to meet the interval data requirement. Education was 
expressed in the form of the number of years of formal 
schooling. Class rather than being measured by a nominal 
scale was expressed in terms of a Bllshen scale score. 
Similarly, other variables were put in a form that was 
acceptable to the statistical techniques. All the 
question on attitudes were expressed in a form that 
allowed the respondent to select the appropriate position 
on a seven point Lickert scale. Some questions were 
put in the form of statements about which the respondent 
p 
was asked to give his opinion. The remaining questions 
on attitudes consisted of a list of people, organizations 
and countries. For each item in the list the legislator 
was asked to express his feelings by chosing a position 
on a seven point scale.* It should be noted that the 
respondent had the option of not expressing an opinion 
1See Bernard Blishen et. al., Canadian Society: 
Sociological Perspectives (3rd ed.; Toronto:. Macmillan, 1968), 
PP. 745 - 750. 
p 
^The options open to the respondent ranged from; 
Completely Agree — Strongly Agree — Agree — Undecided 
-- Disagree — Strongly Disagree — Completely Disagree. 
-'The respondent was asked to chose from among the 
following alternatives: Completely Positive Feelings — 
Strongly Positive Feelings — Positive Feelings — Neutral 
— Negative Feelings — Strongly Negative Feelings — 
Completely Negative Feelings. 
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on any given question. Thus all attltudinal questions 
have responses which could be considered a response on an 
Interval scale. 
Distribution and Response 
The questionnaires were distributed and returned 
in a two month period lasting from the third week of April 
to the third week of June, 1973. Each questionnaire was 
accompanied by a covering letter from Dr. Conrad Winn on 
behalf of the Ontario Legislative Project. The unsigned 
questionnaires were to be returned in the mails. Respondents 
were also Invited to mail, separate from the survey, a 
stamped card addressed to Dr. Winn requesting a statement 
of the project goals and/or copies of scholarly work based 
on their responses. By this "inducement" technique, 
respondents could be distinguished from non-respondents 
and follow-up was facilitated. 
In the present legislature the two opposition 
parties, the Liberals and the New Democrats, have only 
limited representation. At the time the survey was 
conducted, the Liberal caucus consisted of twenty-two 
members and the New Democratic Party contingent was made 
up of nineteen legislators. Groups of this size provide 
a relatively small population. If a low response rate 
is encountered from these parties it will increase the 
difficulty of making accurate and reliable statements 
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as to the attltudinal patterns of the parties. 
Consequently, a particular effort was made to obtain 
responses from Liberal and New Democratic members. 
The questionnaires were distributed to these caucuses by 
1 
members of the respective parties. After the survey 
had been dispersed for one month those Liberals and 
New Democrats who had not responded were personally 
contacted and urged to complete the questionnaire. It 
was through these measures that a relatively high 
response rate was secured for the two opposition parties. 
The Progressive Conservative Party, due to its 
substantial majority in the Legislature, represented a 
group from which a lower response rate would produce a 
sample size acceptable for statistical purposes. This 
fact allowed attention to be concentrated on eliciting 
responses from opposition MLA's and from certain sections 
of the Progressive Conservative caucus, namely MLA's 
holding executive positions.2 Questionnaires were mailed 
to all members of the Progressive Conservative caucus. 
Mr. James Breithaupt MLA circulated the survey 
among members of the Liberal Party while Mr. Stephen 
Lewis, leader of the New Democratic Party, performed the 
same function in his caucus. I gratefully acknowledge 
their help. 
2Executive positions were defined as being 
cabinet posts and parliamentary assistantships. 
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After a period of one month, Progressive Conservative 
members who had not responded were either personally 
contacted or were mailed an additional questionnaire. 
Overall there was a usable response rate of 55^ 
to the questionnaire. Between the parties the rate ranged 
from a high of Sk% with the New Democratic Party to a low 
of k6% for the Progressive Conservative Party.2 The 
variations in the number of respondents from each party 
is Important once a valid sample of each party has been 
obtained. The disproportionate number of New Democratic 
Party members included in the overall sample will not 
bias the results of the multivariate statistical 
techniques. 
Using the data supplied by respondents of the 
three parties, a number of hypotheses related to the 
attltudinal patterns of Ontario legislators were tested. 
It is now necessary to outline the hypotheses, and the 
results of the tests. 
•^Included in this second mailing to Progressive 
Conservative caucus members was a cover letter provided 
by Mr. John Smith, Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister 
of Education, which urged completion of the questionnaire. 
2For the actual response rates by party see Table I. 
TABLE I 
RESPONSE PATTERNS BY PARTY 
PARTY 
Progressive Conservative 
Liberal 
New Democratic Party 
Total 
POSSIBLE 
RESPONSE 
76 (100*) 
22 (100*) 
19 (100*) 
117 (100*) 
ACTUAL 
RETURN 
38 (50*) 
13 (59*) 
16 (84*) 
67 (57*) 
USEFUL 
RETURN1 
35 (46*) 
13 (59*) 
16 (84*) 
64 (55*) 
USEFUL 
RETURN2 
31 (41*) 
12 (55^) 
15 (79*) 
58 (50*) 
-'•One questionnaire was returned after analysis of the data had started 
and was therefore not included in any of the computations. Two replies had 
more than 50* of the questions unanswered and were thus deemed to be unacceptable 
for analytical purposes. 
2Not all respondents completed all the questions on the survey. A total 
of six respondents had eight or more ideological question unanswered. It was 
felt that such a large number of missinc- values would prevent accurate factor 
scores from being calculated. As a result all statistics relating to factor 
score or discriminant analysis are based on the fifty-eight returns in this group. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
Attitude Structure and Political Orientation 
The questionnaire that was circulated to Ontario 
MLA's Included thirty-seven questions designed to reveal 
political attitudes. These questions encompassed a wide 
range of areas. Some of the questions, particularly 
those dealing with religious groups and foreign countries, 
were not Important for their superficial elements but fpr 
the connotations that they entailed. In other words, many 
of the questions functioned as symbols for much larger 
concepts. For example, the legislators were asked to 
express the type of feelings they held for such organizations 
as the Lions Club and the Empire Club. The Lions Club 
embodies the values held and endorsed by the middle class 
in Ontario, if not in Canadian, society. The Empire Club, 
on the other hand, is a creature of affluent upper-middle 
and upper classes. While the Empire Club has lost a 
•^The questionnaire was constructed under the 
close supervision of Dr. Winn, who wished to discover 
the relevance to the provincial party system of his 
spatial models of the federal party system. See Conrad 
Winn, "Spatial Models of Party Systems: An Examination 
of the Canadian Case," University of Pennsylvania 
dootoral dissertation, 1972. See also Conrad Winn and 
John McMenemy, "Political Alignment in a Polarized City: 
Electoral Cleavages in Kitchener, Ontario," Canadian 
Journal of Political Science (June, 1973). 
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considerable degree of its exclusiveness, it retains the 
image of a privileged elite based on the circumstances of 
an earlier age. The Lions Club provides an adequate 
symbol for the goals and demands of a middle class society. 
The Empire Club performs the analogous function for the 
upper class. By expressing their feelings on such 
organizations, the legislators express to some extent how 
well their personal goals and demands fit those established 
by the various classes. 
It should be noted that no single symbol could be 
found to represent the lower-middle and lower class. No 
organization builds its ideals fully around the goals of 
the lower classes. It may be argued that labour unions 
espouse the cause of the workingman but the unionized 
occupations are not synonymous with the lower classes. A 
number of measures must be employed to reflect the 
divisions within the lower sections of society. The 
feelings of legislators toward labour leaders, factory 
workers and farmers may represent together a more accurate 
reflection of opinion toward lower social strata than any 
single variable. 
*It is felt that legislators will preoelve the 
lower class differently depending upon the socio-
economic milieu from which they come. The workingman may 
not represent the interests of the lower class to a 
legislator that is from a rural area. As a result more 
than one measure of the lower class was felt to be 
necessary. 
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Numerous questions were devised to test other 
areas of concern. Included in these areas of concentration 
are: the role of the government in the economy and society 
generally, the rights of the individual, ethnic and 
religious prejudice, nationalism, welfarism, and 
corporatism. The preceding is certainly not meant to be 
an exhaustive list of the concerns found in the questionnaire. 
However, these are the central themes that formed the basis 
for the construction of attltudinal patterns. When 
constructing attltudinal patterns one must be cognizant 
of the fact that some of the symbols represent more than 
one area of concern and as such are difficult to classify 
into one particular category. 
As Eysenck states, attitudes show a considerable 
degree of organization or structure. The fact that an 
individual holds a particular attitude carries with it 
i 
implications about other attitudes. The attitudes of 
legislators on matters representing the diverse areas 
of concern can be consolidated into an overall pattern 
of attitudes. An attitude related to the role of the 
government may be correlated to a position that the 
legislator took on the role of traditions within society. 
If a pattern can be established for a number of areas 
then the political orientations of legislators can be 
determined. 
•^Eysenck, pj>. clt.. p. 265. 
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The initial step towards the identification of 
attltudinal patterns is the calculation of the correlation 
coefficients. A correlation coefficient measures the 
extent to which variation in the dependent variable is 
2 
associated with the variation in the independent variable. 
It is on the basis of correlation between variables that 
the attltudinal patterns will be established. 
The actual procedure employed to Isolate patterns 
is factor analysis. Factor analysis clusters variables 
into groups that can be said to represent a certain 
conceptual dimension. As a result each factor can be 
considered a composite variable made up of a number of 
discrete variables that are related. Each relevant variable 
is said to load on the factor. The loading is a statistical 
measure of the degree to which a factor predicts a 
variable. Thus the loading is similar to correlation 
coefficients except that one measures the degree of 
xAppendix II is the presentation of a Pearson 
correlation coefficient matrix for the thirty-seven 
questions dealing with ideology. 
2 
A common mistake in the interpretation of 
correlation coefficients is the belief that a high value 
for a coefficient is brought about by dispersion in the 
amounts of the separate variables. It is not possible to 
say that high levels of cohesion In a legislative body 
explain the presence of low correlation coefficients. 
Differences in the absolute values has no bearing on the 
size of the coefficient. Only the extent to which 
variations are associated can affect the value of the 
coefficient. See Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of 
Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chamber of 
a State Legislature." Western Political Quarterly. XIV 
(1961), 473 - 480. 
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association between concrete variables and the other the 
association between a discrete variable and an abstract 
variable. Factor analysis will go beyond correlation 
coefficients and construct a number of abstract variables 
with each new variable representing a particular 
dimension in the data.1 
A factor analysis was performed on the survey 
2 
data and the results are presented in Table II. 
Essentially six conceptual patterns exist. However of 
these six only three appear to be worthy of significant 
discussion. The three most important variables account 
for almost eighty-three percent of the common variance 
in the factor structure. The remaining three factors 
between them account for only sixteen percent of the 
common variance. In addition, the three less significant 
•••For a much more detailed account of the mechanics 
and purpose of factor analysis see R. J. Rummel, "Under-
standing Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
XI (1967), 444 - 480. 
2 
The factor analysis was of an R-type and was 
produced using the factor analysis programme contained 
in SPSS. The full sixty-four cases were used in the 
computation with pairwlse deletion for missing values 
being in effect. PA2 with iterations was the factoring 
method. The number of factors extracted was equal to the 
number of factors with an eigenvalue greater than or 
equal to 1.0. The factors were rotated by means of the 
varimax method. For an explanation of the factor analysis 
programme see Norman Nie; Dale H. Dent; and Hadlai C. 
Hull, SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(New York: McGraw - Hill, 1970). 
TABLE II 
ROTATED FACTORS, ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES 
II III IV v 
Tory Factor 
Anglicans 
Monarchy 
Empire Club 
Britain 
Lions Club 
Canadian Manufact-
urers Association 
Farmers 
Traditions 
Orange Lodge 
Separate School 
Support 
Auto 
.73 
.72 
.72 
.72 
.70 
.62 
.62 
.51 
.46 
-.45 
-.46 
22 
07 
15 
24 
07 
21 
08 
27 
16 
29 
45 
.00 
.12 
.47 
-.09 
.20 
.50 
.14 
.21 
.41 
-.04 
-.25 
.12 
-.12 
-.18 
-.04 
.00 
-.17 
.05 
-.09 
-.14 
.30 
.04 
.16 
.00 
.04 
-„09 
.18 
.05 
.04 
-.05 
-.07 
.13 
-.07 
Socialist Factor 
Women's Liberation 
North Vietnam 
Union Leadership 
Welfare Recipients 
Community Action 
Groups 
Underdeveloped 
Nations 
-.07 
-.18 
-.15 
.14 
.11 
.15 
69 
.68 
68 
68 
,66 
.66 
12 
06 
03 
06 
.03 
.23 
.06 
.13 
.02 
-.08 
.19 
-.16 
•°3 .03 .jJO 
-.05 .06 .09 
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Factory Workers 
Welfare Programmes 
University 
Professors 
Pollution Probe 
Nationalization of 
Industries 
Prevent Takeovers 
by Foreign 
Corporations 
Free Enterprise 
I 
.30 
-.27 
.05 
.11 
-AZ 
-.07 
.50 
II 
.63 
.60 
.54 
.51 
.51 
.35 
-.56 
III 
.01 
.02 
.03 
- . 0 9 
-.24 
-s30 
.31 
IV 
.17 
.10 
.23 
.09 
.12 
-.07 
-.24 
V 
.09 
-.11 
.21 
.27 
-.24 
.13 
.09 
VI 
.09 
.05 
-.03 
.16 
.23 
.11 
.02 
Whig Factor 
Land Developers 
Corporation 
Executives 
United States 
Ontario Medical 
Association 
Censorship Cannot 
be Justified Execpt 
in time of War 
.26 -.07 
±31 
±11 
.40 
-.27 
-.06 
.03 
.09 .00 
.08 
.11 
.07 
-.08 
.10 
.05 
-.13 
-.44 
.05 
-.22 
-.18 
.05 
.11 
-±11 
-.02 
Cultural Liberalism Factor 
Jews 
French Canadians 
Federal Government 
has too much 
Power 
±11 
.33 
.27 
±12. 
±lk 
.00 
.06 
.12 
-.02 
.59 
.47 
-.40 
.22 
.13 
-.10 
.02 
-.09 
-.11 
Police Power 
Prevent Immigration 
of Certain Groups 
Collectivism Factor 
Committee for an 
Independent Canada 
Abortion and the 
Individual 
Statlsm Factor 
Government Role in 
the Economy 
Percent Common 
Variance 
Eigenvalue 
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factors have a very limited number of variables with 
high loadings. Because of their much greater statistical 
significance, factors I, II, and III will receive preferred 
attention in the analysis that follows. 
Factor I clearly represents the traditional and 
established elements within the province. Among the variables 
with high loadings on this factor are: the Empire Club, 
Canadian Manufacturer's Association, Lions Club and 
Anglicans. All of these variables are symbols of established 
power and the status quo. However also loading on Factor 
I are positive feelings towards: the monarchy, Great 
Britain, the Orange Lodge, and farmers. The factor 
includes opposition to the extension of aid to Roman 
Catholic Separate Schools. As such, the factor incorporates 
rural-oriented Protestantism with support for the British 
connection and the established order within the province. 
Factor I can be identified as representing the Tory streak 
that Is said to exist in Canadian politics.1 
Factor II is totally dissimilar from the first. 
In the place of established groups and institutions are 
variables representing such groups as: Women's Liberation, 
union leadership, welfare recipients, community action 
groups, factory workers, university professors, and 
Pollution Probe. These groups tend either to lack power 
•^See Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour In Politics 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 196877 PP. 1 -
54. In that section Horowitz provides an operational 
definition of the term Tory. The terms Whig and Socialist, 
which are used throughout this study, are also defined. 
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or to be associated with the lower levels of the social 
structure. Factor II encompasses support for: the 
nationalization of select industries, the introduction of 
a government-operated automobile insurance programme, 
the prevention of takeovers of Canadian industries by 
foreign corporations, and the extension of welfare 
programmes. Factor II represents a left-wing or socialist-
oriented dimension. 
Loading on Factor III are a number of economic 
interest groups Including the Ontario Medical Association 
and the Canadian Manufacturers Association. In a general 
way Factor III tends to include support for corporation 
executives, land developers, and the values, interests 
and beliefs as represented by the United States. This 
factor could presumably be classified as an economic 
liberalism factor. One weak point in this conclusion is 
that a belief in the use of censorship also loads highly 
on this factor. Thus the factor tends to go beyond a 
simple incorporation of laissez-faire economic principles. 
The willingness to compromise personal liberty makes the 
factor closely akin to the ideals of Whigism. 
The remaining three factors represent less 
statistically important dimensions. Factor IV with Its 
high loadings on ethnic minorities and support for 
Roman Catholic Separate Schools Indicates an attltudinal 
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dimension associated with cultural liberalism. This 
conclusion is re-enforced by the fact that a desire to 
prevent the Immigration of certain racial and religious 
groups receives a significant negative loading on the 
factor. Factor V outlines a concern for society as a 
whole. It deals with the role which the community must 
play in relation to the individual. The stance adopted 
in Factor V can be classed as a collectivist position. 
The matter of abortion is seen as a decision to be made 
by more than just the individual involved. High loadings 
for the Committee for an Independent Canada and community 
action groups generally illustrates faith in the 
community approach to problem solving. The final factor 
has a very limited number of variables loading on it, 
but those variables that do load either favour expansion 
of the role of government in society or curtailment of 
interests in the private sector. Therefore Factor VI 
might be said to be a 'statlsm' factor and as such is 
closely related to the socialist factor. 
Through factor analysis the attitude patterns 
of Ontario legislators have been constructed. This 
construction does not require the same a priori 
considerations as the Rice and Beyle techniques. Factor 
analysis provides for a maximum of flexibility and a minimum 
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of researcher error. The Ideological patterns furnished 
by factor analysis provide the basis for more sophisticated 
investigation Into party solidarity and cohesion. 
Partisanship and Party Stability 
The attltudinal patterns of individual legislators 
can be compared through the computation of factor scores. 
Differences in raw scores reveal little about the 
This proposition has been examined in Chapter I. 
2 
Factor scores are computed using the following 
equation: 
FS1 = (Lt x (Xx - Xx) / SDX) + (L2 x (X2 - X2) / 
SD2) + . . . (Ln x (Xn - Xn) / SDn) 
A factor score is computed for each case for each 
significant factor. Thus in the present study each 
MLA would have six factor scores with one score 
corresponding with each of the factors outlined in 
Table II. In the computation of the factor scores 
only those variables which have a significant loading 
on the factor are added to the equation. Therefore 
the example given above can be Interpreted in the 
following manner. The factor score for individual 
X on factor one is equal to the loading of the first 
significant variable on factor one multiplied by the 
difference between the value individual X assigned to 
variable one and the overall mean value assigned to the 
variable by all respondents. The resulting figure is 
then divided by the standard deviation associated with 
the mean of the variable. This procedure is repeated 
for each variable that loads significantly on the 
factor. The figures are then summed to arrive at the 
factor score. 
In this study relatively small scores mean that 
the attitudes of the individual legislator are similar 
to the average of the legislature. A high positive value 
symbolizes basic disagreement with the attributes 
represented by the factor. By the same token, a negative 
value of some magnitude represents agreement. 
51 
attltudinal pattern which the legislator favours. Soores 
are only comparable between legislators on one factor at 
a time. It is possible that the legislators could be 
divided into sub-groups and the mean scores of these 
groupings be compared by a difference of means test. At 
the most such an approach could utilize an analysis of 
variance test to consider the differences between groups 
and the variations within the groups. Such procedures do 
not isolate Individuals who should not be members of the 
sub-group. Instead the values of the factor scores of 
these miscla.ssif led Individuals are Included in the 
calculation of the group mean which ultimately affects 
the results of the test. Therefore a procedure is 
needed which will take the factor scores and divide the 
legislators into the most effective and cohesive sub-
groups . 
Such a result could be achieved through the use 
of discriminant analysis. Discriminant analysis takes 
an established group division, constructs an overall 
pattern for each sub-group and then tests how well 
each individual conforms to the sub-group pattern. The 
probability of each individual fitting into a sub-group 
is then determined. If there is a legislator whose 
1For an explanation of discriminant analysis see: 
W.J. Dixon, ed. BMP (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1968), pp. 96 - 112. 
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attltudinal pattern is better matched with a sub-group 
other than the one to which he was originally designated 
then the legislator is re-assigned. The problem of testing 
ideological solidarity can therefore be approached in 
two ways. First, the factor scores can be used to place 
2 
MLA's into hypothetical Ideological groupings. Second, 
assignment to an a priori grouping could be done on the 
basis of the. party affiliation of the respondent. No 
matter which method of group assignment is used the 
procedure that follows is the same. The variables on 
which the programme is to discriminate are fed into the 
2 
system. Group patterns are calculated and the probability 
of a member belonging to each sub-group is computed. 
^This procedure Involves the placing of all 
members into a group that corresponds to the factor on 
which a negative factor score was obtained. For 
convenience sake only the three most significant factors 
were considered. An assumption wa3 made that the groupings 
were not mutually exclusive. It is possible that a 
member could have a negative factor score on more than 
one factor. In this circumstance the legislator was 
placed in both sub-groupings. In two instances a 
negative score was not obtained on any of the factors. 
In these cases the members were arbitrarily assigned to 
the group which corresponded to the lowest positive 
value. 
2The variable input which is used can be varied. 
In this study six basic runs were made. Discriminant 
analysis was applied to the sub-groups on the basis 
of: all ideological variables; Tory, Socialist and. 
Whig variables; constituency variables, and; personal 
characteristics. 
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The arrangement of ideological blocs constructed 
1 
using the factor score method is shown in Table III. 
The blocs are basically analogous to the present party 
structure. Sixty-five percent of the Progressive 
Conservative respondents qualify as Tories, forty-two 
percent of the Liberals as Whigs and one hundred percent 
of New Democrats as Socialists. This means that New 
Democrats tend to be the most ideologically cohesive. 
Progressive Conservatives tend to overlap into the 
Whig category to some extent. The Liberals appear to be 
the most diversified. The party is almost equally divided 
between the three ideological camps. In addition, none 
of the three blocs is dominated by members of the Liberal 
party. 
•^This breakdown used all ideological variables. 
2If the responses are taken as representative of 
all MLA's then the breakdown of the blocs for the entire 
legislature would be: 
PC 
LI3 
NDP 
TORY 
47 {65%) 
(90*) 
6 (25*) 
(10*) 
-
53 
(100*) 
WHIG 
29 (35*) 
(76*) 
9 (42*) 
(24*) 
-
38 
(100*) 
SQC. 
-
7 (33*) 
(28*) 
19 (100*) 
(72*) 
26 
(100*) 
TOTAL 
76 (100*) 
22 (100*) 
19 (100*) 
117 
TABLE III 
MEMBERSHIP OF IDEOLOGICAL BLOCS BY PARTY 
PARTY 
Progressive Conservative 
Liberal 
New Democratic Party 
Total 
TORY 
20 ( 65*) 
( 87*) 
3 ( 25*) 
( 13*) 
-
23 
(100*) 
WHIG 
11 (35*) 
( 69*) 
5 (42*) 
( 31*) 
-
16 
(100*) 
SOCIALIST 
-
4 ( 33*) 
( 21*) 
15 (loo*) 
( 79*) 
19 
(100*) 
1 
31 
12 
15 
58 
FOTAL 
(100*) 
(100*) 
(100*) 
VJX 
-P-
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Another measure of the different ideologies held 
by the parties and blocs is available by comparing the 
factor scores. The scores are outlined in Table IV. 
The Progressive Conservative Party's identification with 
Toryism is borne out by the fact that it is the only 
party to have a negative factor score on the Tory factor. 
Similarly, on the Socialist factor the New Democrats are 
the only party to be closely associated. On the Whig 
factor the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals 
both have negative means with the Conservatives having 
the most negative score. On all of these scores the 
Liberals have a mean which falls between the Progressive 
Conservatives and the New Demoorats. Such a result may In 
fact substantiate Table Ill's finding that the Liberals 
are the least cohesive of the parties. Their position 
between the Conservatives and the New Democrats allows 
the party to have wings In the Tory and Socialist blocs 
as well as the Whig group. 
Another method of testing the stability of parties 
is to use the party affiliation of MLA's when constructing 
the hypothetical groups for purposes of discriminant 
analysis. When this method is used it is found that all 
It is interesting to note that on the remaining 
three factors the Progressive Conservatives maintain a 
positive value while the two opposition parties hold 
negative values. As a result the Conservatives can be 
said to be more distantly associated with the Ideals of 
cultural liberalism, collectivism and statism. 
TABLE IV 
FACTOR SCORES BY PARTY AND BLOC 
PARTY 
OR BLOC 
PC 
Liberal 
NDP 
Tory 
Whig 
Socialist 
FACTOR 
I 
- 3 . 7 5 
1.20 
6 .94 
- 3 . 6 2 
- 1 . 7 7 
6 .00 
FACTOR 
I I 
2 . 9 5 
. 2 3 
- 7 . 2 1 
3 .36 
2 . 0 9 
-6.56 
FACTOR 
I I I 
- 1 . 7 5 
- . 4 0 
4 . 1 5 
- . 9 2 
- 2 . 3 7 
3 .27 
FACTOR 
IV 
. 7 1 
- . 9 1 
- . 8 5 
. 8 3 
- . 0 7 
- 1 . 0 2 
FACTOR 
V 
. 2 6 
- . 2 2 
- . 3 7 
. 2 6 
.32 
- . 6 0 
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party members are properly classified. However when the 
ideological variables are broken down into the various 
factors cracks begin to appear in the party hegemony. 
On the basis of only Tory variables one Progressive 
Conservative and one Liberal are Incorrectly classified. 
When Socialist variables are considered four Conservatives 
hold attitudes that are more similar to the attitudes held 
by the Liberal Party than those espoused by their own 
party. By the same token one Liberal should be reclassified 
as a Progressive Conservative. Whig variables bring about 
the greatest amount of dissension. Based on Whig variables 
five Conservatives should be Liberals while three Liberals 
should be Conservatives and one Liberal should be a member 
of the New Democratic Party caucus. Therefore on the 
basis of the three subdivisions in the ideological 
variables the conclusions arrived at by using the 
factor score method are confirmed. 
All New Democrats are correctly classified. This 
tends to support the finding that New Democrats are more 
ideologically cohesive than the other parties. The 
Progressive Conservatives had ninety-three possibilities 
to be misclassifled but in actual fact only ten members 
or 10.8* were incorrectly grouped. The Liberals on the 
other hand had thirty-six chances to be designated 
incorrectly and six members or 16.7* of the party 
caucus was improperly classified. 
•^ See Table V for discriminant classification of 
party members by ideological variables. 
TABLE V 
DISCRIMINANT CLASSIFICATION OF PARTY MEMBERS BY IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES 
All Ideological Variables 
31 12 15 
Socialist Variables 
p 
R A 
E R 
A T 
L I 
E 
S 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
HYPOTHETICAL 
PC 
31 
0 
0 
PARTIES 
LIB NDP 
0 0 
12 0 
0 15 
P 
R A 
E R 
A T 
L I 
E 
S 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
HYPOTHETICAL 
PC 
27 
1 
0 
PARTIES 
LIB NDP 
4 o 
11 0 
0 15 
28 15 15 
Tory Variables 
~ 
p 
R A 
E R 
A T 
L I 
E 
S 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
HYPOTHETICAL 
PC 
30 
1 
0 
PARTIES 
LIB NDP 
1 0 
11 0 
0 15 
Whig Variables 
P 
R A PC 
E R 
A T LIB 
L I 
E 
S 
NDP 
31 12 15 
PC 
26 
3 
0 
29 
HYPOTHETICAL 
PARTIES 
LIB NDP 
5 
8 
0 
13 
o 
l 
15 
16 VA 00 
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Discriminant analysis provides an estimate of 
the probability of the individual belonging to each 
sub-group. The mean and mode probabilities of party 
members belonging to their present party is outlined in 
Table VI. The probabilities are a more accurate method 
of measuring the cohesion which was outlined in the 
previous paragraph. For this reason the breakdown as 
given by mean and mode probabilities is identical to 
the method in the previous paragraph but the measure is 
given greater statistical precision. 
In calculating the Ideological patterns, 
discriminant analysis orders the variables which are 
the most important In calculating the patterns. The 
order, and relative strength, of each variable in 
distinguishing between groups is Important to a discussion 
of the groups. If all the variables are characterized 
as being political, economic or cultural It is found 
that variables dealing with economics, that is variables 
characterizing a free enterprise - socialist split, 
tend to be the most powerful variables for distinguishing 
one party from another. Variables dealing with cultural 
and political issues generally appear to be of lesser 
importance. This distinction holds true not only for 
all ideological variables but also for the Tory, Socialist 
and Whig variables.1 
1For a complete breakdown see Appendix IX. 
PARTY 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
TABLE VI 
PROBABILITY OF PARTY MEMBERS BELONGING 
TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PARTIES 
ALL 
IDEOLOGICAL 
VARIABLES 
MEAN 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
• MODE 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
TORY 
VARIABLES 
MEAN 
. 914 
. 904 
1.000 
MODE 
. 996 
. 9 9 7 
1 .000 
WHIG 
VARIABLES 
MEAN 
. 8 2 6 
. 8 7 5 
1.000 
MODE 
. 947 
. 9 2 6 
1.000 
SOCIALIST 
VARIABLES 
MEAN 
.692 
.548 
.982 
MODE 
.766 
.656 
1.000 
AVERAGE 
MEAN 
. 8 1 1 
.778 
.994 
MODE 
. 870 
.769 
1.000 
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Finally, discriminant analysis allows a functional 
equation to be derived to compute the probability of any 
given individual fitting into a sub-group. Thus where 
the attitudes of an Individual are known it Is possible 
to estimate the party affiliation and ideological bloc 
to which that individual is most likely to belong. 
Such a function obviously gives the researcher the ability 
to determine the direction a party's Ideology is moving 
by employing the same equations at future dates. As a 
result the degree to which party ideology remains stable 
and solidarity continues at its present level can be 
calculated when new members are added to the party caucus. 
Spclo-Eoonomlc Indicators 
Not all parties draw their support equally from 
all groups across the province. The parties appeal to 
different socio-economic groupings and this appeal is 
reflected in the make-up of the party caucus. If the 
constituency affects the attitudes held by legislators, 
then the members of an ideological bloc should have 
constituencies which show greater similarities with other 
bloc members than with other party members. 
The discriminant functions to determine the 
probability of party affiliation based on all ideological 
variables are presented in Appendix VIII. 
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Table VII compares the constituency characteristics 
of both party and bloc members. If one accepts earlier 
findings that each party basically corresponds to a bloc 
then the changes in constituency characteristics should 
correspond to what the 'true party' should be. Therefore 
it was not totally unexpected to find that Tories 
represent rural-Protestant constituencies, even more so 
than the Progressive Conservatives. Whigs, on the other 
hand, become perceptively more urban (though less dominated 
by industrial workers) than Liberal members. The 
characteristics held by Socialists remain about identical 
to those evidenced by New Democrats.2 
A similar comparison may be made between the 
party members who belong to different ideological blocs. 
Progressive Conservatives who are Tories represent ridings 
which are consistently less urban and contain lower 
percentages of workers and Roman Catholics than ridings 
held by Conservatives who are Whigs. Liberal Tories 
follow the same pattern. The percentage of urban-dwellers, 
Industrial workers, and Roman Catholics are below the 
Liberal Party average. At the same time these indicators 
Constituency characteristics are based on 
subjective measures provided by the legislators. As a 
result the figures need not represent perfectly the 
actual situation. 
2 
This may be taken as a further reason for the 
ideological cohesion of the NDP., le. a homogeneous 
constituency base. 
TABLE VII 
CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS BY PARTY AND BLOC 
CHARACTERISTIC1 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholics 
Distance 
PC 
71.39 
20.71 
30.58 
32.80 
155.03 
TORY 
66.30 
26.04 
29.70 
29.48 
160.26 
LIB 
69.67 
23.17 
39.33 
37.92 
118.00 
WHIG 
73.94 
17.69 
32.63 
38.69 
136.75 
NDP 
88.80 
2.07 
54.00 
44.53 
219.07 
soc. 
88.05 
3.63 
53.95 
44.36 
191.26 
OVERALL 
75.53 
16.40 
38.45 
36.89 
163.93 
•••All figures are expressed in terms of percentages, except 
Distance which is in the form of miles from Queen's Park. 
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are higher than the Liberal Party norm for Socialist 
Liberals. 
Just as parties can be distinguished on the 
basis of Ideology they can be distinguished using 
constituency characteristics. A discriminant analysis 
using constituency variables to distinguish the parties 
was performed. The results of the analysis found that 
eleven Progressive Conservatives, five Liberals and four 
2 
New Democrats should be members of other parties. If 
constituency features did in fact influence the legislator's 
attitudes then the factor scores of the party members 
who were misclassifled should be significantly different 
from other party members. Table X outlines the results. 
No consistent pattern emerges. It Is found that 
Conservatives who represent constituencies similar to 
Liberal or NDP constituencies tend to be more intensely 
Tory but also more in favour of Whig and Socialist ideals. 
Thus it would appear that Conservatives from atypical 
constituencies try to be all things to all people. 
Liberals representing Conservative-style constituencies 
tend to be more anti-Tory and anti-Socialist than other 
"^Slnce all New Democrats fall within the 
Socialist bloc no breakdown for that party is conceivable. 
See Table VIII. 
2 
The discriminant classification of party members 
by constituency and personal variables is given In Table 
IX. 
CHARACTER-
ISTIC1 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholics 
Distance 
TORY 
69.3 
23-5 
30.3 
29.2 
159.8 
PC 
WHIG 
74.8 
16.3 
33.2 
37.4 
133.0 
TABLE VIII 
CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS OF BLOC MEMBERS BY PARTY 
SOC. TORY 
46.7 
43.3 
25.7 
31.7 
163.3 
LIBERAL 
WHIG 
71.0 
22.0 
36.0 
37.0 
115.6 
SOC. 
85.3 
9.5 
50.0 
50.0 
87.0 
TORY 
-
-
-
-
— 
NDP 
WHIG 
-
-
-
-
-
SOC. 
88.8 
2.1 
54.5 
44.5 
219.1 
•'•All figures are expressed in terms of percentages, except Distance 
which is In the form of miles from Queen's Park. 
TABLE IX 
DISCRIMINANT CLASSIFICATION OF PARTY MEMBERS 
BY CONSTITUENCY AND PERSONAL VARIABLES 
Personal Characteristics 
p 
R A 
E R 
A T 
L I 
E 
S 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
HYPOTHETICAL 
PC 
18 
2 
1 
PARTIES 
LIB NDP 
5 3 
10 0 
1 13 
21 16 21 
Constituency Characteristics 
p 
R A 
E R 
A T 
L I 
E 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
HYPOTHETICAL 
PC 
20 
3 
2 
PARTIES 
LIB NDP 
7 4 
7 2 
2 11 
25 16 17 
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TABLE X 
MEAN SCORES ON IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS FOR NEW 
PARTY SUB-GROUPS CREATED BY DISCRIMINANT 
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUENCY FEATURES1 
PARTY 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
SUB-
GROUP 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
TORY 
FACTOR 
-3.75 
- 2 . 9 3 
- 4 . 4 9 
-6.55 
1 .20 
3.57 
. 1 0 
1 .49 
6 . 9 4 
4 . 6 6 
1 2 . 2 2 
6 . 4 0 
SOCIALIST 
FACTOR 
2.95 
3.91 
1.26 
.85 
. 2 3 
7 .51 
- 1 . 7 0 
-3.93 
- 7 . 2 1 
-6.94 
- 7 . 1 2 
- 7 . 2 8 
WHIG 
FACTOR 
- 1 . 7 5 
- 1 . 1 3 
- 1 . 8 6 
- 4 . 4 l 
- . 4 0 
. 3 6 
- . 5 1 
- 1 . 1 6 
4 . 1 5 
2 . 3 5 
6 .32 
4 . 0 8 
1Table X identifies party sub-groups on the 
basis of discriminant analysis of constituency variables. 
By this discriminant analysis three new party sub-groups 
are created for each real party caucus. For the three 
real party caucuses and the nine hypothetical party sub-
groups the factor scores are presented. 
party members. Those Liberals who are closely associated 
with NDP-type constituencies also tend to be more anti-
Tory but at the same time more Whiglsh and Socialist. 
New Democrats, who on the basis of constituency variables 
should belong to other parties, remain almost equally 
committed to socialist ideals. However, if a New Democrat 
represents a Conservative riding he is less opposed to 
Tory and Whig ideals. Thus while no consistent pattern 
emerges It is evident that constituency features have 
affected the legislator's attitudes. Depending upon the 
party that the legislator represents it may bias him 
towards or against the Ideology of the party that should 
prepresent his constituency. Generally speaking, 
constituency features appear to have a significant impact 
on ideology and party cohesion. A more detailed inquiry 
into the consituency influence will be undertaken, along 
with an investigation of other relationships, through the 
use of specific hypotheses. 
CHAPTER IV 
69 
SOLIDARITY AND THE PARTIES OF ONTARIO 
Introduction 
The previous chapter established the pattern 
of political orientations of Ontario legislators. 
Chapter III did not attempt to construct orientation 
pattern through the use of explicit hypotheses. Rather 
the structure of ideological groupings was approached 
in a very general fashion. Factor analysis was performed 
on the responses to ideological questions and this 
allowed patterns of attitudes to be isolated. Discriminant 
analysis picked up on these attitude patterns and 
allocated individual legislators into blocs and parties 
on the basis of the relationship between the attltudinal 
positions of the individual and the positions of the 
parties and blocs. The combination of factor analysis 
and discriminant analysis techniques permitted construction 
of "natural" ideological blocs. However, the determination 
of the ideological limits of the bloos and parties does not 
answer questions related to the influence of party, 
constituency and electoral margin on ideology. Thus 
Chapter IV will seek to measure the impact of these influences. 
In order to accomplish this, specific hypotheses will be 
applied to the foundations established in the previous 
chapter. 
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Hypotheses 
Using the data collected through the survey the 
following hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis I: 
Members who represent constltuenoles with similar 
demographic characteristics will have similar 
attltudinal patterns 
From the earlier review of existing studies, the 
purpose of this hypothesis may already be clear. Ontario 
is a diverse province in terms of socio-economic make-up. 
There exist cleavages in the population based on religion, 
class, ethnic origin and urban-rural differences. 
Hypothesis I posits the belief that similar types of socio-
economic environments produce dispositions to hold similar 
attitudes on a variety of issues. The assumption lying 
at the base of this hypothesis is that a constituency 
choses a legislator who so shares the views of the 
constituency that in following his own personal beliefs 
he is fulfilling the demands of the constituency. 
1 
A decision was reached not to include a measure 
of ethnicity because ethnicity cannot readily be tested on 
an interval or ordinal scale. However, it may be noted that 
previous studies have shown a high association between 
ethnicity and religion. While it is not suggested that 
religion is a substitute for ethnicity, the fact that there 
exists a high correlation between the two variables indicates 
that the inclusion of ethnicity would likely only re-enforoe the 
results. 
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Hypothesis II: 
The most marked difference in attitudes will be between 
members representing urban cons11tueno1es and 
members from rural districts 
This hypothesis Is an extension of the principles 
contained in Hypothesis I. If individual legislators 
reflect the feelings of their constituents, then their 
attltudinal differences should correspond to the demo-
graphic differences of their constituencies. 
Hypothesis III: 
The greater the size of the parliamentary caucus. 
the lower the level of cohesion and solidarity 
Not only are there differences in the socio-
economic make-up of the one hundred and seventeen 
constituencies but there are also wide variations in 
the sectional or regional interests represented. 
According to this hypothesis, the electoral success of a 
party is proportional to its ability to represent varying 
interests. It would thus hold that the greater the 
number of seats a party wins, the greater the number of 
factional interests represented in its caucus. If 
constituency features influence the attitudes held by a 
legislator, then the party representing the most interests, 
or the winning party, will be the the most factional and 
the least cohesive. 
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Hypothesis IV: 
Members representing constituencies atypical 
of the party will hold attitudes 
distinguishable from the 
majority of the party 
This hypothesis follows directly from the 
reasoning underlying some of the previous hypotheses. 
Hypothesis V: 
For any given party. members with small electoral 
margins in their constituencies will be closer 
In attitude to the beliefs of the local 
opposition party than will members 
with large electoral margins 
It appears reasonable to assume that the legislator's 
principal interest is his own election. When his electoral 
margin is small, he must make special efforts to identify 
himself publicly with the attitudes of voters who do not 
normally support his party. By virtue of the tendency to 
minimize cognitive dissonance, the legislator will 
become personally more sympathetic to the values of 
the main family of voters whose support he seeks. 
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Hypothes is VI: 
In constituencies typical of those represented by 
£ party, a member's electoral success Is a 
function of the extent that his 
attitudes conform to those of 
his party leadership 
Not all legislators reflect the influences of 
their constituencies. Legislators who deviate from 
the attitudes of the party norm, even though they represent 
constituencies in which their election is dependant upon 
the loyalty of groups previously committed to that party, 
are more likely to have a smaller plurality than their 
colleagues representing similar constituencies. Such 
a belief is based on the idea that the legislators' 
deviation from the party line will alienate certain 
segments of groups that would ordinarily support the 
candidate of the party. This alienation, and possible 
desertion from the party, results in an electoral 
margin narrower than would normally be expected. 
Hypothesis VII: 
The greater the role of party leadership in 
recruiting the member. the more likely the 
member will follow the party norm 
Active recruitment by the party of candidates 
would appear to be one of the chief methods of ensuring 
loyalty to the party values. First, the party would 
generally pursue those individuals whose attitudes and 
beliefs already conform with those of the party. Second, 
active party recruitment would heighten the sense of 
obligation that a legislator would feel towards his 
party. 
Hypothesis VIII: 
Members who hold attitudes that differ from the 
party norm will tend to value the importance 
of the constituency more highly than 
loyalty to the party 
When a legislator values constituency interests 
highly and the demographic portrait of that constituency 
is atypical of his party, he is likely to be subject to 
pressures encouraging him to adopt attitudes atypical 
of his party. Therefore most legislators seek to find 
a Justification for their actions. By placing an 
emphasis on the role of the constituency a member can 
easily accept and rationalize the differences between 
the attitudes held by the party and his own personal 
convictions. 
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Hypothesis IX: 
Members who hold attitudes different from the 
party norm will pqroelve themselves as 
unlnfluentlal in party affairs 
Member with attitudes differing from those of 
the party's majority will perceive that they are distant 
from the leadership of their party and as a result are 
unable to exert as much Influence on the decisions of 
the party as their colleagues. 
Statistical Tests 
Hypothesis I: 
A considerable amount of attention has been 
focused on the subject of constituency influence and the 
attitudes of elected politicians. In the previous chapter 
references were made to differences In demographic 
features that exist between the constituencies of party 
and bloc members. The tables outlines only the raw 
score differences and do not establish whether a 
statistical significance can be attached to such 
variations. 
Hypothesis I can be supported statistically. 
First, the confidence limits for the party means are 
computed. If ideology Is affected by the demographic 
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features of the constituency, the riding characteristics 
of blocs should provide a more distinct breakdown. 
Table XI outlines the confidence limits for the parties 
and blocs. The intervals are illustrated in Figures 
I and II. The confidence limits provide evidence that 
the constituency does in fact affect the attitudes of 
legislators. The variations evidenced In Table XI and 
Figures I and II are borne out by a chi-square test. 
The differences in the demographic characteristics 
associated with both party and bloc members are significant 
2 
at the .001 level of significance. 
Hypothesis II: 
In this study only four major features of an 
M.L.A.'s constituency were taken into account. Two of 
these characteristics are measures relevant to the 
xThis result can be expected even though It is 
maintained that the parties are already influenced by 
constituency characteristics. If legislators from 
similar ridings coalesce around certain attitudes then 
by studying blocs the Influence of legislators from 
atypical constituencies should be eliminated since 
these atypical legislators would be associated with other 
blocs. 
2 
The calculated chi-square value for parties is 
24.3. The ohi-square value for blocs Is even greater 
coming to 32.0. To be significant at the .05 level of 
significance a chi-square value of at least 9.488 would 
have been necessary. The .01 level is associated with 
the figure 13.217 and the .001 level with 18.465. 
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TABLE XI 
CONFIDENCE LIMITS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES" 
VARIABLE 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholics 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholics 
PC 
61.7 - 81.1 
12.8 - 28.7 
24.4 - 36.8 
26.3 - 39.3 
TORY 
55.1 - 77.5 
16.7 - 35.4 
23.5 - 35.9 
22.3 - 36.7 
LIBERAL 
55.3 - 84.0 
10.5 - 35.9 
27.4 - 48.7 
29.8 - 50.3 
WHIG 
60.3 - 87.5 
7.0 - 28.4 
22.9 - 42.4 
30.6 - 46.8 
NDP 
76.9 -100.0 
0.0 - 4.7 
46.7 - 61.3 
38.8 - 50.3 
SOCIALIST 
78.2 - 97.9 
0.0 - 7.3 
47.1 - 60.8 
39.3 - 49.5 
All figures are expressed in terms of percent. 
FIGURE I 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES 
BY PARTY 
URBAN 
o>- 100 
FARMERS 
•Hi 00 
WORKER^ 
100 
CATHOLICS 
O H 
PARTY MEANS: 
^ PC 
100 
p 
N 
Progressive Conservative; L = Liberal 
New Democratic Party 
LIB 
^ 
NDP 
FIGURE I I 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES 
BY BLOC 
URBAN 
i — • 100 
FARMERS 
H 1 0 0 
WORKERS 
100 
CATHOLICS 
BLOC MEANS: T = Tory; W = Whig; S = S o c i a l i s t 
% % 1 Tory | | Whig 
100 
s3 Socia l i s t 
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the urban - rural cleavage. First, there Is the percentage 
of the constituency which is made up of urban dwellers. 
The second characteristic, the percentage of farmers in 
the population of a riding, may appear to be the 
complement of the urban variable. In actual fact, the 
measures are not perfectly correlated. Not everyone who 
lives in a rural setting Is a farmer. This fact is 
particularly evident in Northern Ontario, where ridings 
are composed neither of urban centres or farmers. 
If political attitudes are not affected by 
urban - rural differences among ridings, political 
attitudes may nevertheless be influenced by the class 
and/or cultural characteristics of ridings. Class differences 
can be made operational as the percentage of Industrial 
workers in a riding. The importance of a religious -
ethnic cleavage can be tested through the use of a 
variable measuring the proportion of Roman Catholics In 
a constituency. It should be recognized that these 
variables do not operate in isolation. For example, 
urban constituencies have a greater possibility of 
containing industrial workers since commerce is 
concentrated in the urban centres. Industrial workers 
also tend to contain a higher proportion of Roman 
Catholics and other ethnic minorities. The overlapping 
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of these variables in particular instances does not 
mean that the pattern is consistent for the entire 
province. The overlapping does mean that each character-
istic is a potentially powerful predictor of attitudes. 
The most powerful variable can be identified by statistically 
controlling the Influence of the other variables. 
The members were divided into blocs. Once the 
members were assigned to blocs, overall means on the 
four demographic features were computed. Two statistical 
measures were employed to evaluate the relative power of 
each variable. Use of the tau statistic achieved a 
score of zero for all variables. Similarly the lambda 
statistic produced a zero result for all measures 
except the percentage of farmers. 
When the demographic variables were used to 
test the cohesion of parties through discriminant analysis 
2 
the four variables were listed In order of importance. 
•^The value of lambda for the farmers variable Is 
.07 which is a relatively minimal value. For a full 
explanation of the tau and lambda statistics see 
Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw -
Hill, 1972), pp. 300 - 303. 
o 
Discriminant analysis orders variables in 
accordance with their relative importance. In addition, 
the programme assigns a weight to this importance which 
is known as the U-statistic. The U-statistic for the 
four relevant variables are: Industrial Workers .7474? 
Farmers .5659; Roman Catholics .5297 and; Urban .5026. 
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In discriminant analysis it was found that the percentage 
of workers was the most important distinguishing feature 
followed by the percentage of farmers, Roman Catholics 
and urban residents. As a result the tests for this 
hypothesis are Inconclusive. All four features are almost 
equally important in their predictive ability. 
Hypothesis III: 
The results of the study would tend to disprove 
the concept that the greater the size of the parliamentary 
caucus the lower the level of cohesion and solidarity. 
Reference must first be made to Tables V and VI. These 
tables show that the Liberal Party tends to be the least 
cohesive. The Liberal members have the lowest probability 
of belonging to their own party. In addition the Liberal 
caucus contains the highest percentage of members who on 
the basis of their attitudes should be members of other 
parties. At the other end of the scale is the New 
Democratic Party. The NDP caucus contains no member 
who should be designated to another party. At the same time 
the average probability of an NDP member belonging to that 
party is a remarkable 99.4*. On both measures the 
Progesslve Conservative Party finds itself in the centre. 
The mean probability of a Conservative M.L.A. belonging 
to that party on the basis of attitudes is 81.1*. 
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Also 10* of the Progressive Conservative caucus hold 
attitudes more in common with another party. 
The breakdown In seats at the time this study was 
conducted was Progressive Conservatives seventy-six. 
Liberals twenty-two, and New Democrats nineteen. 
Therefore at least part of the hypothesis Is borne out. 
The smallest caucus is the most cohesive. However the 
largest parliamentary group is more cohesive than the 
Liberal Party. While the Liberal caucus is slightly 
larger than that of the NDP and less than a third of the 
Progressive Conservative caucus, the Liberal Party is 
the most diverse ideologically. Thus it would appear 
that the Progressive Conservatives have been able to 
forge a political coalition which avoids many of the 
diverse, marginal Interests in the province. In short, 
the Progressive Conservatives have a coalition which 
represents "average" Ontario. 
In exploring the possibility of coalitions, it 
Is Interesting to note the results of Figure I. Ideological 
cohesion parallels demographic cohesion. Except for the 
percentage of a riding that Is urban, the New Demoorats 
exhibit less variation on the demographic features than 
either of the other parties. On all four demographic 
1l6.7# of the Liberal caucus were mlsclasslfled 
on the basis of ideological variables. Liberal members 
have a 77.8# probability of belonging to that caucus. 
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Indicators the Liberal Party showed the greatest variation. 
The amount of diversity in the Progressive Conservative 
caucus was once again between the two extremes. This 
parallel relationship between ideological and demographic 
cohesion may further substantiate the presence of a 
causal relationship between constituency features and the 
attitudes of the legislator representing that constituency. 
Therefore the finding severely questions—or at least 
proves an exception to—the traditional assumption that 
the winning party represents the most Interests and as a 
consequence is the most factional. However the results 
show that the party that represents the greatest amount 
of Interests is the most diverse ideologically but that 
there is no a priori reason for this party to be the 
victorious one. 
Hypothesis IV: 
The Importance of demographic features of 
constituencies has already been established in the first 
three hypotheses. Consequently the contention contained 
in hypothesis four flows naturally from the previous 
findings. Members representing constituencies atypical 
•^The traditional belief may be more valid in a 
two-party system. Since Ontario is a one-party dominant 
multi-party system the validity of the assumption in a 
two-party system is beyond the scope of this study. 
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of the party do in fact have Ideological beliefs distinct 
from the rest of the party. This belief is substantiated 
in two ways. Table VIIItakes the Ideological divisions 
within the parties and compares the values for the 
demographic features. Table X approaches the problem In 
the reverse. Table X establishes which members should 
not, on the basis of constituency variables, be members 
of that party. Then the factor scores on the three most 
Important factors are compared. No matter which approach 
is adopted the results support the hypothesis. 
The differences in the demographic features as 
outlined in Table VIII are generally significant. At the 
.05 level of significance Tory Liberals are distinct from 
Socialist Liberals on all four Indicators. Whig Liberals 
are significantly different from Tory Liberals in every 
area except percentage of Roman Catholics. By the same 
token. Whig Liberals differ from Socialist Liberals on 
the variables measuring the percentage of industrial 
workers and Roman Catholics. In the Progressive 
Conservative Party Tories differ from Whigs only on the 
•^Even though the differences in factor scores as 
outlined in Table X are significant there are no patterns 
between parties and as a result the method outlined for 
Table VIII would be preferable. It must be recognized 
that the two procedures are not entirely Interchangable. 
Under the procedure being used for Table X four New 
Democrats are misclassifled while Table VIII classifies 
no New Democrats outside the Socialist bloc. 
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basis of the percentage of Roman Catholics (at the .05 
level of significance). When the level of significance is 
changed to .10 the blocs are significantly different on 
the percentage of farmers and Roman Catholics. 
Since the greatest proportion of Liberals are 
Whigs and Progressive Conservatives are Tories, those 
members who do not fit the majority ideology should come 
from constituencies which are also atypical. This result 
seems to be borne out by Tables VIII and X. 
Hypothesis V: 
Hypothesis V posits the belief that the more 
atypical a constituency is from the party norm the more 
likely that member is to be facing stiff electoral 
pressure. Hypothesis V relates the electoral margin to 
deviation in party ideology through the link of constituency 
features. This hypothesis is also concerned with those 
legislators who, while representing typical constituencies, 
have an ideology more closely associated with another 
party. This deviation from the party line would be 
reflected in a reduced electoral margin. 
This hypothesis Is tested by the computation of a 
Pearson correlation coefficient. In fact, six coefficients 
must be calculated—two for each party. The correlation 
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coefficient will measure the degree of association between 
the legislator's perceived safety of his seat and factor 
scores. 
The hypothesis explicitly states that a legislator 
who is in close contention with another party is more 
sympathetic to the beliefs of that party. Therefore 
the respondents must be divided into groups on the basis 
of which party placed second in the constituency. Since 
an Ideology is associated with each party, the coefficient 
will measure the degree of association between seat 
security and sympathy towards the relevant party ideology. 
To prove the hypothesis, a negative co-efficient must be 
present which would signify that the more insecure the 
seat the more sympathetic the legislator is to the party 
that placed second.1 
Four of the six cases substantiate the hypothesis. 
!lt should be noted that a member can be more 
sympathetic to the beliefs of another party and still be 
as partisan as., if not more partisan than, other party 
members. Such a situation is outlined In Table X where 
Progressive Conservatives representing NDP-like con-
stituencies are more sympathetic to Socialist beliefs 
but at the same time have the highest pro-Tory scores. 
2 
The following are the Pearson correlation 
coefficients relating safeness of the seat and factor 
scores on the ideological factors associated with the 
party that placed second In the constituency. 
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In constituencies that had Liberals or New Democrats 
running second to the winning candidate, a negative 
correlation was found between seat security and sympathy 
to the Ideology of the party running second in the 
constituency. It is interesting to note that Liberals 
and New Democrats who beat Progressive Conservative 
candidates had a slight, though not significant, positive 
correlation between their estimate of seat security and 
their score on the Tory factor. This slight positive 
value would indicate that the more successful Liberals 
and New Democrats are slightly more tolerant of the Tory 
philosophy than less successful legislators. Such a 
tolerance may be part of an effort to broaden electoral 
1 
appeal. 
Winning Party 
PC 
NDP 
PC 
LIB 
LIB 
NDP 
Second Party 
LIB 
LIB 
NDP 
NDP 
PC 
PC 
Coefficient 
-.3098 
-.6840 
-.2836 
-.7975 
+.1351 
+.0798 
Factor 
Whig 
Whig 
Socialist 
Sooialist 
Tory 
Tory 
•^Another reason that Liberals facing PC opposition 
may have slightly positive coefficients is that Liberal 
representing constituencies atypical of that party hold 
seats safer than typical party members. In four of the 
party's five atypical constiuencies the Progressive 
Conservatives placed second. It is the affinity between 
the Tory philosophy and these members that may cause much 
of the positive relationship. If only typical ridings 
are used a negative relationship is found. 
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Generally a relationship exists between electoral 
margin and the willingness of a legislator to accept the 
views of another party. The relationship is not perfect 
but with four of the six cases fitting the requirements 
(and a fifth bordering on the requirements) the weight of 
the data is on the side of substantiating the hypothesis. 
Hypothes is VI: 
The object of this hypothesis is to Isolate from 
hypothesis five the influence of legislators who represent 
constituencies similar to the party average but who chose 
to deviate from the party ideological norm. Before, 
hypthesis VI can be tested, the typical party constituency 
must be identified. For the purposes of this study a 
typical constituency is classified as similar to the party 
i 
on the basis of the discriminantanalysis results. 
Hypothesis VI will be tested in a manner similar to 
the procedure used in hypothesis V. However in this 
instance Interest is focused on a legislator's attitudes 
towards the three major factors and not Just the factor 
associated with the second-placing party. Electoral 
success is once again represented by the variable estimating 
the electoral security of the seat. To prove this 
-^See Table IX for the actual breakdown of 
c ons t i tueno1es. 
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hypothesis, a positive correlation should be produced 
on the factor score associated with the particular party 
and a negative coefficient on the other two scores. 
In constituencies which are atypical, a reverse 
pattern would be expected. A low plurality In an atypical 
constituency would be brought about by a legislator's 
strict adherence to the party line. In an atypical riding 
a politician would enhance his electoral chances by 
deviating from the party's Ideological position. 
Conceptually this hypothesis, and its corollary, 
are represented in Figure III (b). This approach 
contradicts the traditional view taken by Thomas A. 
Flinn. The Flinn model is presented in Figure III (a) 
and it sets forth the belief that in a typical constituency 
a low plurality results from a low degree of loyalty to 
the party. Conversely the Flinn model maintains that in 
typical constituencies high pluralities result from 
lower levels of loyalty to the party. Therefore the 
relationship as hypothesized in this study stands at 
total odds with the theory advanced by many writers. 
Correlation coefficients were produced for members 
representing typical and atypical ridings on the three 
most important factors. This procedure gave a total of 
eighteen coefficients. When the coefficients are matched 
91 
FIGURE III 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY LOYALTY AND CONSTITUENCY FACTORS 
III (a) high 
Loyalty 
I 
low 
plurality 
constituency 
pressure 
„ --• high 
plurality 
low 
Typicality of District 
high 
Adopted from Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in 
the States: Some Causal Factors," American Political 
Science Review. LVII (1964), p. 68. 
Ill (b) high 
Loyalty 
low 
/ 
high 
plurality 
constituency 
pressure 
\ low 
\plurality 
Typicality of District 
hiffh 
Hypothesized relationship between electoral margin, 
constituency features and party loyalty. 
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for party members representing typical and atypical 
ridings there are nine pairs of coefficients. Of these 
nine pairs seven of them contain coefficients with 
different signs. In an eighth pair the coefficient 
drops from a value of .95 for atypical ridings to .15 for 
typical ridings. As a result the hypotheses and Illustration 
represented by Figure III (b) are proved. In constituencies 
typical of the party, electoral success is enhanced by 
adherence to the party philosophy while in atypical ridings 
electoral security is obtained through deviation from the 
party norm.1 
1The nine pairs of coefficients are presented 
below. 
'arty 
PC 
PC 
LIB 
LIB 
NDP 
NDP 
Class 
typical 
atypical 
typical 
atypical 
typical 
atypical 
Tory 
Factor 
.29 
-.40 
-.24 
.26 
-.14 
.95 
Whig 
Factor 
-.07 
-.06 
.36 
-.72 
.15 
.95 
Socialist 
Factor 
.23 
-.37 
.30 
-.33 
.15 
Only the Progressive Conservatives on the Whig Factor and 
and the New Democrats on the Whig Factor go against the 
trend. On the three most Important pairs (the Conservatives 
on the Tory factor, Liberals on the Whig and New Democrats 
on the Socialist) opposite signs are found for typical 
and atypical groups. These pairs are the most important 
since they relate the dominant party ideology to seat 
security for typical and atypical ridings. 
However it will be noted that In the case of the NDP on 
the Socialist Factor the negative cofficlent is associated 
with typical constituencies and not atypical ridings as 
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Hypothesis VII: 
A member's ideology may be influenced by more 
than the demographic character of his constituency. His 
attitudes may be influenced by the roles of his party and 
its leadership in his political career. Hypothesis VII 
argues that the greater the role of a party In recruiting 
an individual as a candidate for the legislature, the 
greater the likelihood the legislator would accept party 
views. 
Pearson correlation coefficients test the 
relationship between party influence on a legislator's 
nomination and the factor scores. No significant 
relationship exists for members of any of the parties on 
the three major factors between the degree of party 
influence and the factor scores. It must be concluded 
that the data does not support the hypothesis. 
might be expected. Since all New Democrats are classed as 
Socialist the party norm is represented by moderation on the 
Socialist Factor. Thus in typical ridings NDPers with low 
pluralities would tend to be extreme Socialists. In 
constituencies typical of the NDP, electoral success is 
brought about by moderation. As a result the problem 
with the NDP is that deviants exceed the party norm rather 
than fall short of the norm, which is the case with the 
Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Regardless of 
what causes the negative co-efficient for New Democrats 
from typical ridings the fact remains that the coefficient 
for NDPers from atypical constituencies is positive. 
^he correlation, coefficients for the factor scores 
and the nomination variable are as follows: 
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Hypothesis VIII: 
This hypothesis assumes that legislators perceive 
potential conflict between constituency and party 
interests. It would therefore be natural for members 
whose attitudes differ from the party to justify their 
views by emphasizing their loyalty to constituency 
interests. Therefore the greater the deviation from the 
party norm, the greater the loyalty to the constituency. 
In order to measure the relationship, respondents 
were asked the following question: "If a majority of your 
constituents were strongly opposed to your party's stand, 
but you had no strong views, how committed would you be to 
your party's position?" Respondents were asked to give the 
response on a seven point scale. A score of one meant the 
legislator would be very committed to the party while a 
response of seven would indicate no commitment to the 
party whatsoever. The direction of the coefficient is 
Just as important as the magnitude. A positive co-
Party 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
Tory 
Factor 
-.01 
.25 
.31 
Whig 
Factor 
.10 
-.21 
.05 
Socialist 
Factor 
-.01 
-.28 
.27 
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efficient indicates that the two variables (le. the factor 
score and the degree of commitment to the party) vary In 
the same direction. A negative coefficient results from 
the one variable increasing in value while the other 
decreases. 
Loyalty to the constituency does not vary 
signflcantly with the factor scores related to factor I. 
The score of factor two varies positively with constituency 
loyalty for members of the New Democratic Party. There-
fore a member who had a relatively high factor score 
would also tend to have a high value on the seven point 
scale. As a result the less loyal a member Is to the 
party line, the more likely he is to have a positive 
factor score for factor two. Thus, a positive coefficient 
indicates that the less the allegiance to the party, the 
less Socialist the individual is. Such a finding tends 
to substantiate the hypothesis as far as the NDP Is 
concerned. 
For the Whig Factor, the Liberal Party has a 
positive coefficient for the relationship with loyalty 
to the constituency. However, the overall pattern 
would only be complete if a positive coefficient existed 
for Progressive Conservatives on the Tory factor. 
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Since two of the parties do fit the pattern hypothesized, 
it can be concluded that the hypothesis Is in fact 
valid.1 
Hypothes is IX: 
Hypothesis IX extends further the concept that the 
member who deviates from the party ideology is isolated 
from the party. A significant relationship between the 
amount of influence a member feels he has In the party 
and the factor scores were found in two cases. First, 
the Liberals who felt influential tended to be pro-
Tory in attitudes. By the same token, influential New 
Democrats tended to be more pro-Whig than ordinary 
NDPers. Theses are not the results that were to be 
expected. If the hypothesis was to be unquestionably 
proven a positive coefficient for the Tory factor score 
and the influence measure would have been necessary for 
the Progressive Conservatives. Similarly a positive 
coefficient for the Liberals on the Whig score and the 
^The correlation coefficients for the factor scores 
and the loyalty to constituency variable are as follows. 
irty 
PC 
LIB 
NDP 
Tory 
Factor 
.18 
-.01 
-.24 
Whig 
Factor 
.24 
.36 
-.40 
Socialist 
Factor 
.07 
-.06 
.44 
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New Democrats on the Socialist score should have been 
present if the view that party deviators consider them-
selves uninfluential was to be established. 
CHAPTER V 
98 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis sought to study three aspects of the 
attitudes of Ontario legislators. First, efforts were 
made to Isolate individual attitude structures or patterns. 
Second, the attitude patterns of members were aggregated 
and the ideological patterns between and within legislative 
groups were analyzed. Finally, attention was focused on 
the relationship between ideology and such external 
variables as constituency features. At this point it may 
be convenient to summarize the results of the research 
as the findings relate to these three purposes. 
The attitudes of Ontario legislators were found to 
fit within three major classifications. For the purposes 
* 
of this study these attitude patterns were labeled as 
Tory, Whig and Socialist. Each pattern had a number of 
attitudes that formed an integral part of the pattern 
and helped in the identification of the underlying dimension 
of the pattern. The Tory pattern was characterized by 
adherence to the values of rural-Protestant Ontario. As 
such, the Tory pattern required an acceptance of the 
British connection and established values and institutions 
within Ontario society. In the case of the Whig pattern, 
belief In the value of free enterprise or economic 
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liberalism seemed to be the dominant feature. As for 
the Socialist pattern, it was typified by an affiliation 
with the values, symbols and institutions of lower social 
classes. In addition the Socialist attltudinal pattern 
required acceptance of a positive role for government 
within society. 
Upon further analysis of the data,it was established 
that the division of members, on the basis of the attitude 
pattern subscribed to, corresponded roughly to the make-up 
of the party caucuses. The Progressive Conservative 
caucus was dominated by legislators who held a Tory 
point of view. All New Democratic Party legislators were 
classed as Socialists. While no single attitude pattern 
was subscribed to by a majority of Liberal members, a 
marked leaning towards a Whig philosophy was evident. 
Thus it was obvious that the degreee of ideological 
dispersion varied from party to party. The most 
ideologically cohesive party was the New Democratic 
Party followed by the Progressive Conservative Party. 
A number of statistical tests were performed to 
establish the significance of the differences in the 
attitude patterns exhibited by the parties. The tests 
produced evidence that showed significant differences 
did exist between the attitude patterns of Ontario 
parties. 
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After the significance of differences In attitude 
patterns and levels of cohesion was established, attention 
was focused on variables that could help explain these 
differences. While the number of these variables was 
limited by the strictures of time, space and significance, 
relationships between constituency features and ideology 
were established. Important demographic features, such 
as differences In a constituency's class, religious and 
urban make-up, exerted pressures on legislators to hold 
attitudes that corresponded to the interests of the 
constituency. Thus a legislator representing a riding 
atypical of the party is pressured to deviate from the 
party's ideological position. This in turn has a direct 
effect on the degree of Ideological cohesion exhibited by 
the parties. It was not surprising to find that the 
measures of dispersion on demographic variables paralleled 
the measures of partisan cohesion. 
It must be noted that the existence of significant 
differences in the beliefs associated with each party is 
no guarantee that the policies advanced by the parties 
will reflect the party's ideological leaning. It may 
in fact be true that the average Progressive Conservative 
voter Is ideologically not all that dissimilar from the 
average Liberal voter, a fact which forces the parties 
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to appeal to the electorate In very similar terms. But it 
does not follow that elected legislators who make up the 
core of the party are also more ideologically alike than 
different. 
Heinz Eulau concluded in his study that what may 
be true of Individuals may not be true of the aggregates 
of which individual persons are members. This statement 
points to a problem that needs further study. Research 
is needed to prove whether the attitude pattern of a 
party is reflected in the policy programme that the party 
adopts• 
In a similar vein further research is needed to 
discover what happens to the attitudes of party members 
when the party obtains power. Research in this area 
would help answer a number of questions. In particular 
this research would help solve the problem of whether 
socialists remain socialists upon the assumption of 
power. Some political scientists believe politicians 
are affected by the demands of governing and often 
desert previous ideological convictions once they are 
thrust into a decision-making role. Another related 
area of concern is the effect elevation to a cabinet or 
Eulau, op., clt.. p. 373. 
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executive position has on the beliefs of a government 
backbencher. As an executive member the legislator must 
accept collective responsibility for government actions, 
but as a backbencher his views were able to vary with 
greater freedom. Therefore the question arises whether 
the views of an executive member are Isomorphic to those 
held when he was a government backbencher. 
The interpretations given to the attitude patterns 
found in this research are not the only interpretations 
available. It is possible that the Tory, Whig and 
Socialist patterns could be re-analyzed using different 
evaluation criteria. Similarly, additional variables 
could have been introduced in an effort to obtain more 
refined results. It would be naive to claim that the 
variables used in this study are the only variables 
to influence the structure of party solidarity. However, 
the variables used are clearly among the most important 
Indicators when proving that the present political 
parties are cohesive as well as disciplined. 
For an example of how these factors and patterns 
could be interpreted differently see Conrad Winn, "Spatial 
Models of Party Systems: An Examination of the Canadian 
Case," University of Pennsylvania Doctoral Dissertation, 
1972. See also Conrad Winn and John McMenemy, "Political 
Alignment in a Polarized City: Electoral Cleavages in 
Kitchener, Ontario," Canadian Journal of Political Science 
(June, 1973). 
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APPENDIX I 
SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF THE ONTARIO LEGISLATURE 1 
Variable' 
TENURE 
MEMBER 
ACTIVE 
NOMINATN 
SEAT 
SECOND 
THIRD 
Part I: Background Information 
The following questions deal with various 
characteristics of yourself, your party and 
your constituency. 
1. For approximately how many years have you 
been an MLA? 
( )2; ( )5; ( )10; ( )15; ( )20; ( )25; ( )30 
2. For approximately how many years have you 
been a registered member of your party? 
( )Years 
3. How active were you in the party organization 
before your election to the Legislature? 
(Very Active)1 2 3 4 5 6 7(Not Active At All) 
4. When you first considered seeking the 
nomination, to what extent did party 
officials encourage you to do so? 
(Very Much) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not At All) 
5. How safe is your seat? 
(Very Safe) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not Safe At All) 
6. In the 1971 election which party placed 
second in your constituency? • 
Third? 
1The questions are reproduced with the same wording, 
and in the same form, as they appeared on the questionnaire 
distributed to the Members of the Legislature. However, 
the amount of space allotted for answers has been reduced. 
^Variable names correspond to the abrevlations 
used in the tables found throughout the body of the study. 
These names were not included on the original survey. The 
names have been added only to help the reader match the 
variable names with the actual question. 
Variable 
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URBAN 
FARMERS 
WORKERS 
CATHOLIC 
DISTANCE 
OCCUP 
CONROLE 
CONLOYAL 
7? 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
SETTING 
BIRTH 13. 
Approximately what percentage of your 
constituency is made up of: 
Urban Voters? ( *) 
Farmers? ( *) 
Industrial Workers? ( *) 
Roman Catholics? ( *) 
How far is your constituency from Queen's 
Park in miles? ( )Miles 
What was your occupation when you were first 
elected to the Legislature? 
In your view, how important should service to 
the constituency be for an MLA? 
(Very Important)1234567(Not Important At All) 
If a majority of your constituents were 
strongly opposed to your party's stand, but 
you had no strong views, how committed would 
you be to your party's position? 
(Very Committed)l234567(Not Committed At All) 
12. In of what type of setting did you spend most 
the years during which you were growinc up? 
( )Large City; ( )Small City; ( )Town; 
( )Rural 
In approximately what year were you born? 
( )1900 or before; ( )1905; ( )1910; ( )1915J 
( )1920; ( )1925; ( )1930; ( )1935; ( )1940 
or after 
YREDUCAT 
YRSERVE 
RELBACK 
CHURCH 
INFLUENC 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
How many years of formal education have you 
received? ( )Years 
Before you were elected to the Legislature, 
for how many years had you held other 
elected public offices? ( )Years 
What is your religious background? 
Do you attend church? 
(Very Often) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not At All) 
Not all MLA's are equally influential. 
Compared to the leaders of your party on the 
one hand and new unproven MLA's on the other 
Variable 
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LEADERS 19. 
how would you estimate your influence in 
party affairs? 
(Very Influential) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not At All) 
How close do you feel to your party's leaders? 
(Consistently 
Very Close) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not Always Close) 
F0RC0RP 
IMMIGRTN 
SEPARATE 
AUTO 
Part II: Political Opinions 
The following questions are intended to elicit 
your opinions. After reading each statement, 
please Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree. 
If you agree completely choose (1); if you disagree 
completely choose (7); otherwise choose a number 
in between. If you have no opinion on a question, 
or prefer not to answer, indicate this by choosing 
(9). 
20. 
21. 
ABORTION 22. 
23. 
24. 
G0VTR0LE 25. 
A major goal of government policy should be to 
prevent the further takeover of the Canadian 
economy by foreign corporations. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
Our country should control the immigration of 
certain racial and religious groups. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
Abortion Is a decision to be made by the 
individual alone. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
The Ontario Government should finance the 
Separate Catholic School System on an equal 
footing with the public system. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
A government operated auto Insurance plan is 
what Ontario needs today. 
(Completely Asrree)l234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
It should be a major purpose of government to 
reduce the gap between the very rich and the 
very poor. 
(Completely A«rree)l234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
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TRADITIN 27. 
Variable 
FREEENTE 26. The strength of this country today is largely 
a product of the free enterprise system. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
Traditions serve a useful social purpose by 
providing stability and continuity. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
WELFARE 28. Though it may be true that public welfare 
programmes are sometimes Inefficient the main 
problem is that not enough money is spent on 
welfare. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
FEDERAL 29. The federal government has too much power when 
compared with provincial and local governments. 
(Completely Aeree)l234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
In terms of present economic conditions, the 
nationalization of some industries would be 
appropriate and effective. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
POLICE 31. While the police should not violate the rights 
of the Individual their surveillance of 
dangerous groups like the Neo-Nazis and 
John Birchers is needed. 
(Completely Agree)12345<$7(Completely Disagree) 9 
CENSOR 32. Except in time of war, censorship in any form 
cannot be justified. 
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9 
NATIONAL 30. 
Part III: Feelings Towards Various Groups 
The following is a list of people, organizations, 
and countries. Using a seven point scale, please 
indicate your feelings about each. The (1) will 
symbolize a completely favourable attitude while 
(7) will stand for an unfavourable one. Once 
again (9) will indicate no opinion. 
Positive 
Feelings 
Negative 
Neutral Feelings 
FACTORY 33. Factory Workers 3 4 5 6 7 9 
FARMER 34. Farmers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
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Variable 
UNDERDEV 35. Underdeveloped Nations 
LIONS 36. The Lions" Club 
ANGLICAN 37. Anglicans 
CIC 38. Committee for an 
Independent Canada 
PR0FESS0 39. University Professors 
ORANGE 40. Orange Lodge 
BRITAIN 41. Great Britain 
JEWS 42. Jews 
NVIETNAM 43. North Viet-Nam 
CORPEXEC 44. Corporation Executives 
FRCDNS 45. French Canadians 
USTATES 46. United States 
EMPIRE 47. Empire Club 
ACTION 48. Community Action 
Groups 
WOMENS 49. Women's Liberation 
UNION 50. Trade Union Leaders 
MONARCHY 51. The Monarchy 
CMA 52. Canadian Manufacturers 
Association 
POLLUTIN 53. Pollution Probe 
DEVELOPE 54. Land Developers 
OMA 55. Ontario Medical 
Association 
WELFRE 56. People on Welfare 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1
 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
APPENDIX II 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR IDOLOGICAL VARIABLES 
FORCORP 
IMMIGRTN 
/ . -^TTOI; 
SEPARATE 
AUTO 
GOVTBOLE 
FREEENTE 
TRADITIN 
WELFARE 
FEDERAL 
NATIONAL 
F 
0 
R 
C 
0 
R 
P 
- . 0 8 
. 0 8 
.24 
.28 
.38 
- . 2 1 
- . 2 4 
.36 
. 0 4 
. 2 4 
I 
M 
M 
I 
G 
R 
T 
N 
- . 0 8 
. 1 3 
- .37 
- . 1 7 
- . 0 3 
.49 
. 3 0 
- . 2 8 
. 2 3 
- . 2 9 
A 
B 
0 
R 
T 
I 
0 
N 
.08 
.13 
- .03 
.15 
.23 
- . 0 2 
. 0 2 
- . 0 5 
. 2 4 
. 1 5 
s 
E 
P 
A 
R 
A 
T 
S 
. 2 4 
- .37 
- . 0 3 
.59 
.45 
- . 4 0 
- . 2 8 
. 3 1 
- .35 
.49 
A 
u 
T 
0 
. 2 8 
- . 1 7 
. 1 5 
.59 
.51 
- .63 
- .35 
.47 
- . 1 0 
. 7 1 
G 
0 
V 
T 
R 
0 
L 
E 
.38 
- . 0 3 
. 2 3 
.45 
.51 
- .39 
- . 1 7 
. 3 0 
- . 2 1 
.47 
F 
R 
E 
E 
E 
N 
T 
E 
- . 2 1 
.49 
- . 0 2 
- . 4 0 
- .63 
-.39 
.48 
-.52 
. 20 
-.65 
T 
R 
A 
D 
I 
T 
I 
N 
- . 2 4 
. 3 0 
. 02 
- . 2 8 
- .35 
- . 1 7 
. 4 8 
- . 2 6 
. 2 4 
- . 4 0 
w 
E 
L 
F 
A 
R 
E 
.36 
- . 2 8 
- . 0 5 
. 3 1 
. 4 7 
. 3 0 
- . 5 2 
- . 2 6 
- . 0 6 
. 5 6 
F 
E 
D 
E 
R 
A 
L 
. 0 4 
. 2 3 
. 2 4 
- .35 
- . 1 0 
- . 2 1 
. 2 0 
. 2 4 
- . 0 6 
- . 2 3 
N 
A 
T 
I 
0 
N 
A 
L 
. 2 4 
- . 2 9 
. 1 5 
. 49 
. 7 1 
. 4 7 
- . 6 5 
- . 4 0 
.56 
- . 2 3 
P 
0 
L 
I 
C 
E 
- . 1 8 
. 4 3 
- . 1 3 
- . 2 3 
- . 2 5 
- . 2 2 
.36 
. 12 
- . 2 7 
. 2 8 
- . 2 6 
C 
•g 
N 
S 
0 
R 
. 2 5 
.09 
.34 
- . 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1 5 
- . 1 4 
- . 1 6 
- . 0 8 
- . 0 4 
. 1 0 
POLICE 
CENSOR 
FACTORY 
FARMER 
UNDERDEV 
LIONS 
ANGLICAN 
CIC 
PROFESS0 
ORANGE 
BRITAIN 
JEWS 
NVIETNAM 
F 
0 
R 
C 
0 
R 
P 
-.18 
.25 
.14 
-.08 
.24 
-.10 
.10 
.27 
.11 
-.23 
.02 
.00 
.22 
I 
M 
M 
I 
G 
R 
T 
N 
.43 
.09 
-.20 
-.02 
-.18 
.23 
.00 
-.12 
-.31 
.24 
.14 
-.32 
-.30 
A 
B 
0 
R 
T 
I 
0 
N 
-.13 
.34 
-.13 
-.13 
-.19 
-.17 
-.09 
-.45 
-.31 
-.09 
-.09 
-.32 
-.01 
s 
E 
P 
A 
R 
A 
T 
E 
-.23 
-.01 
.08 
-.28 
.14 
-.32 
-.23 
.23 
.11 
-.17 
-.33 
.16 
.45 
A 
U 
T 
0 
-.25 
.05 
.21 
-.40 
.19 
-.42 
-.20 
.06 
.23 
-.32 
-.18 
.04 
.40 
G 
0 
V 
T 
R 
0 
L 
E 
-.22 
.15 
.24 
-.21 
.09 
-.13 
-.04 
.28 
.23 
-.04 
.10 
.12 
.32 
F 
R 
E 
E 
E 
N 
T 
E 
.36 
-.14 
-.14 
.32 
-.35 
.46 
.18 
-.09 
-.38 
.27 
.15 
-.08 
-.52 
T 
R 
A 
D 
I 
T 
I 
N 
.12 
-.16 
.05 
.20 
-.15 
.32 
.43 
-.06 
-.20 
.28 
.33 
.11 
-.31 
w 
E 
L 
F 
A 
p 
E 
-.27 
-.08 
.23 
-.15 
.36 
-.23 
-.07 
.04 
.24 
-.03 
-.04 
.15 
.44 
F 
E 
D 
E 
R 
A 
L 
.28 
-.04 
-.02 
.16 
.02 
.11 
.12 
-.09 
-.07 
.18 
.21 
-.07 
-.15 
N 
A 
T 
I 
0 
N 
A 
-.26 
.10 
.14 
-.26 
.23 
-.46 
-.21 
-.05 
.22 
-.25 
-.16 
-.02 
.52 
P 
0 
L 
I 
C 
E 
-.14 
-.23 
.13 
-.10 
.24 
.05 
-.11 
-.15 
.32 
.09 
-.19 
-.27 
c 
E 
N 
S 
0 
R 
-.14 
-.02 
-.05 
-.04 
-.12 
-.07 
-.07 
.00 
-.19 
.15 
.04 
.18 
CORPEXEC 
FRCDNS 
USTATE3 
EMPIRE 
ACTION 
WOMENS 
UNION 
MONARCHY 
CMA 
POLLUTIN 
DEVELOPE 
OMA 
WELFRE 
F 
0 
R 
C 
0 
R 
P 
-.36 
.09 
-.30 
-.27 
.33 
.29 
.28 
-.16 
-.20 
.20 
-.22 
.04 
.13 
I 
M 
M 
I 
G 
R 
T 
N 
.29 
-.37 
.18 
.33 
-.22 
-.24 
-.37 
.16 
.33 
-.08 
.02 
.05 
-.24 
A 
B 
0 
R 
T 
I 
0 
N 
-.17 
-.20 
.13 
-.17 
-.11 
.02 
-.13 
-.08 
-.21 
-.18 
-.25 
-.24 
-.08 
S 
E 
P 
A 
R 
A 
T 
E 
-.35 
.11 
-.25 
-.46 
.28 
.25 
.22 
-.42 
-.46 
.15 
-.18 
-.25 
.08 
A 
U 
T 
0 
-.48 
-.09 
-.29 
-.63 
.27 
.37 
.38 
-.29 
-.67 
.21 
-.41 
-.41 
.09 
G 
0 
V 
T 
R 
0 
L 
E 
-.28 
.00 
-.10 
-.34 
.28 
.35 
.36 
-.08 
-.34 
.21 
-.18 
-.25 
.32 
F 
R 
E 
E 
E 
N 
T 
E 
.60 
-.04 
.35 
-.63 
-.23 
-.48 
-.44 
.41 
.74 
-.19 
.34 
.41 
-.37 
T 
R 
A 
D 
I 
T 
I 
N 
.50 
-.03 
.33 
.41 
-.17 
-.24 
-.16 
.44 
.57 
-.03 
.24 
.17 
-.19 
w 
E 
L 
F 
A 
R 
E 
-.28 
.28 
-.07 
-.32 
.31 
.41 
.43 
-.23 
-.29 
.30 
-.14 
-.07 
.40 
F 
E 
D 
E 
R 
A 
L 
.07 
-.04 
.02 
.32 
.01 
.04 
-.02 
.30 
.24 
-.22 
.05 
.11 
-.05 
N 
A 
T 
I 
0 
N 
A 
L 
-.49 
.02 
-.20 
-.59 
.12 
.38 
.40 
-.36 
-.62 
.29 
-.48 
-.36 
.27 
P 
0 
L 
I 
C 
E 
.12 
-.08 
.09 
.43 
-.10 
-.38 
-.20 
.27 
.27 
-.14 
.15 
.30 
-.16 
c 
E 
N 
S 
0 
R 
-.26 
.06 
-.27 
-.17 
-.08 
.15 
-.17 
-.09 
-.30 
.06 
-.37 
-.27 
.16 
FORCORP 
IMMIGRTN 
ABORTION 
SEPARATE 
AUTO 
GOVTROLE 
FREEENTE 
TRADITIN 
WELFARE 
FEDERAL 
NATIONAL 
F 
A 
C 
T 
0 
R 
Y 
.14 
-.20 
-.13 
.08 
.21 
.24 
-.14 
.05 
.23 
-.02 
.14 
F 
A 
R 
M 
E 
R 
-.08 
-.02 
-.13 
-.28 
-.40 
-.21 
.32 
.20 
-.15 
.16 
-.26 
U 
N 
D 
E 
R 
D 
E 
V 
.24 
-.18 
-.19 
.14 
.19 
.09 
-.35 
-.15 
.36 
.02 
.21 
L 
I 
0 
N 
S 
-.10 
.23 
-.17 
-.32 
-.42 
-.13 
.46 
.32 
-.23 
.11 
-.4* 
A 
N 
G 
L 
I 
C 
A 
N 
.10 
.00 
-.09 
-.23 
-.20 
-.04 
.18 
.43 
-.07 
.12 
_. 91 
P 
R 
0 
F 
E 
S 
S 
0 
.11 
0 
R 
A 
N 
G 
E 
-.23 
B 
R 
I 
T 
A 
I 
N 
.o; 
- . 3 1 . 2 4 . 1 4 
- . 3 1 - . 0 9 - . 0 9 
. 1 1 - . 1 7 - . 3 3 
. 2 3 - . 3 2 - . 1 8 
. 2 3 - . 0 4 . 1 0 
- . 3 8 . 2 7 . 1 5 
- . 2 0 . 2 8 . 3 3 
. 2 4 - . 0 3 - . 0 4 
- . 0 7 . 1 8 . 2 1 
.22 - . 2 5 - . 1 6 
J N C 
E V 0 
W I R 
S E P 
T E 
N X 
A E 
M C 
.00 
-.32 
-.32 
.16 
.04 
.12 
-.08 
.11 
.15 
-.07 
-.02 
.22 
-.30 
-.01 
.45 
.40 
.32 
-.52 
-.31 
.44 
-.15 
.52 
-.36 
.29 
-.17 
-.35 
-.48 
-.28 
.60 
.50 
-.28 
.07 
-.49 
POLICE 
CENSOR 
FACTORY 
FARMER 
UNDERDEV 
LIONS 
ANGLICAN 
CIC 
PROFESS0 
ORANGE 
BRITAIN 
JEWS 
NVIETNAM 
F 
A 
C 
T 
0 
R 
Y 
-.23 
-.02 
.17 
.50 
.14 
.37 
.37 
.37 
.16 
.37 
.48 
.44 
F 
A 
R 
M 
E 
p. 
.13 
-.05 
.17 
.22 
.46 
.55 
.20 
.06 
.36 
.45 
.27 
-.07 
u 
N 
D 
E 
R 
D 
E 
V 
-.10 
-.04 
.50 
.22 
.19 
.35 
.31 
.27 
.12 
.27 
.31 
.50 
L 
I 
0 
N 
S 
.24 
-.12 
.14 
.46 
.19 
.66 
.24 
-.05 
.37 
.39 
.29 
-.17 
A 
N 
G 
L 
I 
C 
A 
N 
.05 
-.0? 
.37 
.55 
.35 
.66 
.41 
.22 
.32 
.54 
.45 
.06 
c 
I 
c 
-.11 
-.0? 
.37 
.20 
.31 
.24 
.41 
.43 
.09 
.19 
.45 
.26 
P 
R 
0 
F 
E 
S 
S 
0 
-.15 
.00 
.37 
.06 
.27 
-.05 
.22 
.43 
.07 
.18 
.35 
.39 
0 
R 
A 
N 
E 
.32 
-.19 
.16 
.36 
.12 
.37 
.32 
.09 
.07 
.34 
.21 
-.02 
B 
R 
I 
T 
A 
I 
N 
.09 
.15 
.37 
.45 
.27 
.39 
.54 
.19 
.18 
.34 
.32 
.00 
J 
E 
W 
S 
-.19 
.04 
.48 
.27 
.31 
.29 
.45 
.45 
.35 
.21 
.18 
N 
V 
I 
E 
T 
N 
A 
M 
-.27 
.18 
.44 
-.07 
.50 
-.17 
.06 
.26 
.39 
-.02 
.00 
.18 
C 
0 
R 
P 
E 
X 
E 
C 
.12 
-.26 
.01 
.37 
-.19 
.43 
.26 
-.09 
-.03 
.44 
.34 
.23 
-.24 
CORPEXEC 
FRCDNS 
USTATES 
EMPIRE 
ACTION 
WOMENS 
UNION 
MONARCHY 
CMA 
POLLUTIN 
DEVELOPE 
OMA 
WELFRE 
F 
A 
C 
T 
0 
R 
Y 
.01 
.34 
.05 
.12 
.55 
.45 
.49 
.13 
-.02 
.44 
.03 
.06 
.53 
F 
A 
R 
M 
E 
R 
.37 
.28 
.31 
.51 
.13 
-.02 
-.09 
.50 
.48 
.10 
.27 
.48 
.16 
U 
N 
D 
E 
R 
D 
S 
V 
-.19 
.30 
-.06 
.02 
.49 
.38 
.22 
-.03 
-.23 
.38 
.06 
.20 
.54 
L 
I 
0 
N 
S 
.43 
.31 
.36 
.73 
.15 
-.14 
-.25 
.52 
.55 
.09 
.37 
.35 
-.03 
A 
N 
G 
L 
I 
C 
A 
N 
.26 
.38 
.26 
.37 
.27 
.07 
.10 
.48 
.34 
.25 
.17 
.33 
.17 
C 
I 
c 
-.09 
.37 
-.24 
.08 
.51 
.31 
.37 
.14 
-.02 
.38 
.00 
-.02 
.22 
P 
R 
0 
F 
E 
S 
S 
0 
-.03 
.35 
-.06 
-.04 
.39 
.38 
.54 
.06 
-.20 
.38 
.06 
.00 
.41 
0 
R 
A 
N 
G 
E 
.44 
.22 
.46 
.56 
.17 
.02 
.04 
.43 
.35 
.04 
.37 
.35 
.23 
B 
R 
I 
T 
A 
I 
N 
.34 
.19 
.20 
.40 
.10 
.08 
.03 
.63 
.39 
.21 
.08 
.32 
.33 
j 
E 
W 
S 
.23 
.65 
.06 
.16 
.27 
.13 
.26 
.19 
.06 
.30 
.19 
.15 
.30 
N 
V 
I 
E 
T 
N 
A 
N 
-.24 
.30 
-.06 
-.30 
.45 
.57 
.44 
-.35 
-.42 
.32 
-.04 
-.23 
.51 
c 
o 
R 
P 
E 
X 
E 
C 
.14 
.69 
.71 
-.17 
-.25 
-.26 
.44 
.73 
-.08 
.61 
.55 
-.15 U) 
F 
R 
C 
D 
N 
S 
u 
s 
T 
A 
T 
E 
S 
E 
M 
P 
I 
R 
E 
A 
C 
T 
I 
0 
N 
W 
0 
M 
E 
N 
S 
FORCORP 
IMMIGRTN 
ABORTION 
SEPARATE 
AUTO 
GOVTROLE 
FREEENTE 
TRADITIN 
WELFARE 
FEDERAL 
NATIONAL 
.09 
-.37 
-.20 
.11 
-.09 
.06 
-.04 
-.03 
.28 
-.04 
.02 
-.30 
.18 
.13 
-.25 
-.29 
-.10 
.35 
.33 
-.07 
.02 
-.20 
-.27 
.33 
-.17 
-.46 
-.63 
-.34 
-.63 
.41 
-.32 
.32 
-.59 
.33 
-.22 
-.11 
.28 
.27 
.28 
-.23 
-.17 
.31 
.01 
.12 
.29 
-.24 
.02 
.25 
.38 
.35 
-.48 
-.24 
.41 
.04 
.38 
u 
N 
I 
0 
N 
.28 
.37 
.13 
.22 
.38 
.36 
.44 
.16 
.43 
.02 
.40 
M 
0 
N 
A 
R 
C 
H 
Y 
-.16 
.16 
-.08 
-.42 
-.29 
-.08 
.41 
.44 
-.23 
.30 
-.36 
c 
M 
A 
-.20 
.33 
-.21 
-.46 
-.67 
-.34 
.74 
.57 
-.29 
.24 
-.62 
P 
0 
L 
L 
U 
T 
I 
N 
.20 
-.08 
-.18 
.15 
.21 
.21 
-.19 
-.03 
.30 
-.22 
.29 
D 
E 
V 
E 
L 
0 
P 
E 
-.22 
.02 
-.25 
-.18 
-.41 
-.18 
.34 
.24 
-.14 
.05 
-.48 
0 
M 
A 
.04 
.05 
-.24 
-.25 
-.41 
-.25 
.41 
.17 
-.07 
.11 
-.36 
W 
E 
L 
F 
R 
E 
.13 
-.24 
-.08 
.08 
.09 
.32 
-.37 
-.19 
.40 
-.05 
.27 
POLICE 
CENSOR 
FACTORY 
FARMER 
UNDERDEV 
LIONS 
ANGLICAN 
CIC 
PROFESS0 
ORANGE 
BRITAIN 
JEWS 
NVIETNAM 
F U 
R S 
C . T 
D A 
N T 
S E 
S 
-.08 .09 
.06 -.27 
.34 .05 
.28 .31 
.30 -.06 
.31 .36 
.38 .26 
.37 -.24 
.35 -.06 
.22 .46 
.19 .20 
.65 .06 
.30 -.06 
A W 
C 0 
T M 
I E 
0 N 
N S 
-.10 -.38 
-.08 .15 
.55 .45 
.13 -.02 
.49 .38 
.15 -.14 
.27 .07 
.51 .31 
.39 .38 
.17 .02 
.10 .08 
.27 .13 
.45 .57 
E 
M 
P 
I 
R 
E 
.43 
-.17 
.12 
.51 
.02 
.73 
.37 
.08 
-.04 
.56 
.40 
.16 
-.30 
u 
N 
I 
0 
N 
- . 2 0 
- . 1 7 
. 49 
- . 0 9 
. 2 2 
- . 2 5 
. 1 0 
. 37 
. 5 4 
. 0 4 
. 0 3 
.26 
. 4 4 
M 
0 
N 
A 
R 
C 
H 
Y 
. 2 7 
- . 0 9 
. 1 3 
. 5 0 
- . 0 3 
. 5 2 
.48 
. 1 4 
.06 
. 4 3 
. 6 3 
.19 
-.35 
c 
M 
A 
. 2 7 
- . 3 0 
- . 0 2 
. 48 
- . 2 3 
.55 
. 3 4 
- . 0 2 
- . 2 0 
. 3 5 
. 3 9 
. 0 6 
- . 4 2 
P 
0 
L 
L 
U 
T 
I 
N 
- . 1 4 
. 0 6 
. 44 
. 1 0 
. 38 
.09 
. 2 5 
. 38 
.38 
. 0 4 
.21 
. 3 0 
.32 
D 
E 
V 
E 
L 
0 
P 
E 
. 1 5 
- . 3 7 
. 0 3 
. 27 
. 0 6 
. 3 7 
. 1 7 
. 0 0 
. 0 6 
. 3 7 
. 08 
.19 
- . 0 4 
0 
M 
A 
. 3 0 
- . 2 7 
. 06 
.48 
. 2 0 
. 3 5 
. 3 3 
- . 0 2 
. 0 0 
. 3 5 
. 3 2 
. 1 5 
- . 2 3 
w 
E 
L 
F 
R 
E 
- . 1 6 
. 1 6 
. 53 
. 1 6 
. 5 4 
- . 0 3 
. 1 7 
. 2 2 
. 41 
. 2 3 
. 3 3 
. 3 0 
. 51 
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xThe correlation coefficients were taken from the correlation matrix 
produced in conjunction with the factor analysis programme. The coefficients were 
based on the full sixty-four cases. In computing the coefficients pairwise deletion 
of missing data was used. For an explanation of the effects of pairwise deletion 
see Norman H. Nie, Dale H. Dent, and C. Hadlai Hull, SPSS: Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw - Hill, 1970), p. 236. 
APPENDIX III 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FACTOR SCORES 
AND VARIABLES BY PARTY AND BLOC 
Tory Factor 
VARIABLE 
Tenure 
Member 
Active 
Nominatn 
Seat 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholic 
Distance 
Conrole 
Conloyal 
Birth 
Yreducat 
Yrserve 
Influenc 
Leaders 
Bllshen 
PC 
.12 
-.03 
-.31 
-.01 
-.13 
-.16 
.18 
-.20 
.25 
±11 
• .31 
.18 
-.24 
-.15 
.06 
.28 
.15 
-.17 
LIB 
-.28 
.14 
-.18 
.25 
-.18 
.15 
-.05 
.00 
-.23 
.28 
.87 
-.01 
.33 
zOl 
-.24 
.40 
-±1H 
.02 
NDP 
.20 
.16 
-.27 
.31 
±m 
±11 
-,62 
-.16 
.13 
-.11 
.17 
-.24 
-.20 
a 05 
.02 
.29 
.24 
-.04 
TORY 
-.10 
-.27 
-.15 
-.21 
-.14 
-.10 
.03 
-.01 
.12 
.19 
.25 
-.26 
-.03 
-.11 
-.11 
.24 
.14 
-.21 
WHIG 
±Ht 
.11 
.01 
-.03 
.03 
-.29 
i2L 
-.25 
.11 
±11 
±11 
±11 
-.40 
-.11 
.03 
±11 
-.24 
-.26 
Socialist Factor 
VARIABLE PC LIB NDP TORY WHIG 
Tenure 
Member 
Active 
Nominatn 
Seat 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholic 
Distance 
Conrole 
Conloyal 
Birth 
Yreducat 
Yreserve 
Influenc 
Leaders 
Blishen 
.34 
.23 
-.44 
-.01 
-.28 
-.11 
.20 
-.31 
.05 
.17 
.35 
.07 
-.24 
-.13 
-.02 
.19 
.01 
-.04 
-.19 
.32 
.03 
-.28 
-.33 
-.31 
.49 
-.49 
.13 
.10 
.32 
-.06 
-.04 
.04 
.26 
.02 
-.44 
-.44 
-.04 
-.13 
ill 
.27 
-.43 
,.16 
-.09 
-.44 
-.16 
.05 
.07 
.44 
-.21 
-.18 
-.02 
-.21 
±lk 
-.15 
.23 
.14 
.00 
-.17 
-.27 
-.14 
.24 
-.12 
-.01 
.00 
.39 
-.35 
-.21 
-.01 
-.32 
.30 
.15 
.01 
.23 
.39 
-.55 
.22 
-.41 
-.04 
.18 
-.42 
-.16 
±lk 
.42 
.17 
-.03 
-.03 
.33 
.18 
-.24 
-.11 
Whig Factor 
Tenure .13 .12 -.08 .02 .26 
Member -.06 .20 -.03 -.23 .09 
Active -.47 -.46 -.22 -.25 -.25 
120 
VARIABLE PC LIB NDP TORY WHIG SOC. 
Nominatn 
Seat 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholic 
Distance 
Conrole 
Conloyal 
Birth 
Yreducat 
Yreserve 
Influenc 
Leaders 
Bllshen 
.10 
-.20 
-.23 
.15 
-.27 
-.12 
.19 
.16 
.24 
-.04 
.03 
-.02 
.27 
±21 
-.17 
-.21 
-.14 
-±11 
.30 
-.61 
.32 
.30 
±11 
±lk 
.26 
.26 
-.12 
-.18 
-±11 
'±11 
.05 
.46 
.21 
-.73 
-.09 
.49 
.20 
.13 
-.40 
.06 
±11 
.10 
±11 
.12 
.12 
-.01 
-.02 
-.17 
.06 
-.13 
.20 
.03 
.10 
-.01 
-.04 
.01 
.14 
±11 
.42 
-.28 
.17 
-.08 
-.39 
±li 
-.48 
-.07 
±11 
±11 
±11 
-.15 
.23 
-.15 
.20 
-.05 
-.10 
-.22 
-.01 
.13 
-.48 
-.22 
.24 
.31 
.12 
.31 
-.04 
±11 
-.17 
.19 
.11 
-.10 
Cultural Liberalism Factor 
Tenure 
Member 
Active 
Nominatn 
Seat 
Urban 
Farmers 
.60 
±§1 
.04 
-.07 
.23 
-.31 
.41 
±11 
.08 
.06 
-.14 
.05 
-.31 
.39 
.16 
.22 
.14 
.09 
-.15 
±11 
-.49 
.48 
.60 
-.03 
.11 
.28 
-.36 
.30 
.63 
±lk 
-.11 
.12 
-.07 
-.04 
.27 
-.01 
.23 
.02 
.02 
-.30 
±lk 
-.44 
VARIABLE PC LIB NDP TORY 
Workers 
Catholic 
Distance 
Conrole 
Conloyal 
Birth 
Yreducat 
Yrserve 
Influenc 
Leaders 
Blishen 
.09 
.20 
.18 
.23 
.12 
-.66 
-.10 
.11 
.04 
-.06 
-.17 
-.33 
.05 
.41 
.32 
-.19 
-.24 
-.28 
-.07 
-.04 
.00 
-.67 
-.33 
.19 
-.12 
.23 
-.18 
-.31 
.09 
.07 
.00 
.44 
.00 
.17 
.08 
.05 
.27 
.12 
-.64 
-.13 
.28 
-.01 
-.01 
-.32 
Collectivism Faptor 
Tenure 
Member 
Active 
Nominatn 
Seat 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholic 
Distance 
.40 
.26 
.06 
.05 
-.21 
-±lk 
.30 
-±11 
-.05 
.40 
.01 
±11 
.17 
-.28 
.12 
.09 
.07 
.00 
-.53 
.08 
.04 
-.01 
.08 
±11 
-.08 
.48 
-.03 
slL 
-.25 
-.18 
±11 
.27 
.46 
-.12 
.02 
-±lk 
.42 
.01 
.03 
±11 
VARIABLE 
Conrole 
Conloyal 
Birth 
Yreducat 
Yrserve 
Influenc 
Leaders 
Blishen 
PC 
.13 
.10 
-.40 
-.14 
.10 
.12 
.10 
-.24 
LIB 
-.25 
-.11 
-.32 
-.10 
.62 
-±11 
-.31 
-.04 
NDP 
-.22 
.03 
-.03 
-.16 
.02 
-.02 
.11 
-.10 
TORY 
.02 
-.04 
-.46 
-.30 
.10 
.11 
.09 
-.25 
WHIG 
-.03 
.13 
.05 
.25 
±11 
-.09 
-.16 
.12 
SOC. 
-.22 
-.08 
-.11 
-.15 
-.14 
.01 
.23 
-.18 
Statlsm Factor 
Tenure 
Member 
Active 
Nominatn 
Seat 
Urban 
Farmers 
Workers 
Catholic 
Distance 
Conrole 
Conloyal 
Birth 
.05 
-.02 
-.02 
.10 
-.19 
.21 
-.23 
-.06 
-.08 
-.07 
.00 
.23 
.14 
.15 
-±21 
.62 
.01 
-.26 
-.68 
.75 
-.11 
.13 
.44 
±11 
-.26 
.19 
.18 
.32 
-.12 
.10 
.14 
-.16 
.15 
-.11 
-.26 
±11 
-±11 
-.10 
-.15 
-.02 
.01 
-.06 
.26 
-.30 
.23 
-.17 
-.01 
.01 
.00 
.19 
±11 
.17 
.05 
-.15 
.02 
.31 
-.43 
-.06 
-.01 
-.08 
.00 
.00 
.14 
-±11 
±11 
.33 
.16 
.15 
.17 
.46 
-.19 
.37 
-.17 
-.61 
.10 
-.23 
.15 
.01 
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VARIABLE PC LIB NDP TORY WHIG SOC. 
Yreducat 
Yrserve 
Influenc 
Leaders 
Blishen 
.18 
.01 
.06 
.00 
.45 
-JLII 
-.73 
.44 
.05 
-.50 
-.18 
.14 
.13 
-.27 
-.16 
.31 
-.05 
.11 
.07 
.54 
-.18 
-.35 
.12 
.25 
-.11 
-.17 
.36 
.08 
-.31 
.08 
APPENDIX IV 
MEAN POSITIONS OF PARTIES AND BLOCS FOR ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 
Forcorp 
Immigrtn 
Abortion 
Separate 
Auto 
Govtrole 
Freeente 
Traditin 
Welfare 
Federal 
National 
Police 
PC 
MEAN SD 
2.97 
3.61 
3.24 
5.47 
5.77 
3.39 
1.77 
2.00 
5.77 
2.39 
6.06 
2.76 
1.4 
2.2 
2.4 
2.1 
1.9 
1.7 
1.0 
1.3 
1.5 
1.8 
1.4 
2.0 
TORY 
MEAN SD 
2.61 
3.23 
2.71 
5.48 
5.96 
2.95 
1.61 
2.26 
6.14 
2.76 
5.91 
2.78 
1.2 
2.3 
2.3 
2.2 
1.8 
1.7 
1.1 
1.4 
1.4 
2.4 
1.6 
1.9 
LIB 
MEAN SD 
2.77 
4.62 
3.46 
1.92 
5.50 
2.20 
2.62 
2.85 
5.23 
5.S3 
4.92 
4.36 
1.4 
2.1 
2.5 
1.1 
1.9 
1.7 
1.7 
1.5 
1.7 
1.2 
1.8 
1.7 
WHIG 
MEAN SD 
3.38 
4.67 
3.50 
3.86 
5.64 
3.27 
2.06 
1.94 
4.86 
3.56 
6.19 
3.40 
1.7 
2.1 
2.5 
2.4 
1.9 
1.9 
1.1 
1.2 
1.6 
2.1 
1.2 
2.2 
NDP 
MEAN SD 
1.44 
5.40 
2.75 
1.81 
1.06 
1.00 
5.56 
3.88 
3.25 
4.14 
1.94 
4.27 
.7 
2.2 
2.1 
1.8 
.3 
.0 
1.7 
1.3 
1.9 
2.1 
1.1 
2.3 
SOC 
MEAN 
1.55 
5.32 
3.25 
1.75 
1.85 
1.15 
5.25 
3.90 
3.65 
4.44 
2.35 
4.26 
SD 
.9 
2.1 
2.9 
1.8 
.9 
.4 
1.6 
1.3 
2.2 
2.2 
1.9 
2.3 
AVERAGE 
MEAN SD 
2.55 1.4 
4.29 2.3 
3.16 2.3 
3.72 2.6 
4.44 2.6 
2.49 1.8 
2.89 2.1 
2.98 2.0 
4.98 2.0 
3.51 2.2 
4.73 2.3 
3.44 2.1 
to 
VARIABLE PC TORY LIB 
Censor 
Factory 
Farmer 
Underdev 
Lions 
Anglican 
CIC 
Professo 
Orange 
Britain 
Jews 
NVletnam 
Corpexec 
FrCdns 
MEAN 
2.97 
2.13 
1.69 
3.18 
2.56 
2.13 
4.38 
4.10 
4.67 
2.06 
2.71 
5.42 
2.97 
2.38 
SD 
2.2 
1.3 
1.0 
1.9 
1.5 
1.4 
2.2 
1.7 
1.9 
1.8 
1.4 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
MEAN 
1.91 
2.09 
1.30 
3.25 
2.44 
1.36 
4.04 
4.55 
5.00 
1.78 
2.67 
5.47 
3.14 
2.52 
SD 
1.6 
1.2 
.5 
1.8 
1.5 
1.2 
2.2 
1.8 
2.1 
1.0 
1.3 
1.4 
1.4 
1.7 
MEAN SD 
2.62 2.5 
2.00 1.3 
2.08 1.2 
2.58 2.1 
3.00 1.2 
3.00 1.1 
3.69 1.9 
4.77 1.4 
5.08 1.8 
3.15 1.3 
2.33 1.4 
4.11 2.0 
3.50 1.1 
2.50 2.0 
WHIG 
MEAN SD 
4.44 
2.06 
2.13 
2.64 
2.88 
2.67 
4.56 
4.07 
4.56 
2.88 
2.56 
5.15 
2.88 
2.44 
2.4 
1.6 
1.2 
2.1 
1.4 
1.5 
2.0 
1.7 
2.0 
1.5 
1.5 
1.9 
1.4 
1.5 
NDP 
MEAN SD 
2.25 
1.50 
2.67 
2.00 
4.64 
2.87 
3.80 
2.38 
5.86 
2.67 
2.50 
3.43 
1.8 
.8 
1.2 
.9 
2.0 
1.8 
2.0 
1.3 
1.5 
1.2 
1.2 
1.7 
5.47 1.3 
2.36 1.5 
SOC 
MEAN 
2.15 
1.50 
2.63 
1.90 
4.33 
3.00 
3.47 
2.95 
5.17 
2.79 
2.33 
3.44 
5.11 
2.11 
SD 
1.7 
.8 
1.2 
1.2 
1.9 
2.1 
1.8 
1.4 
2.0 
1.3 
1.1 
1.7 
1.6 
1.3 
AVERAGE 
MEAN SD 
2.71 2.1 
1.93 1.2 
2.02 1.1 
2.73 1.8 
3.15 1.8 
2.51 1.5 
4.08 2.1 
3.92 1.7 
5.05 1.8 
2.45 1.3 
2.58 1.3 
4.65 1.8 
3.72 1.7 
2.40 1.5 
VARIABLE PC TORY LIB 
UStates 
Empire 
Action 
Womens 
Union 
Monarchy 
CMA 
Pollutin 
Develope 
OMA 
Welfre 
MEAN 
2.84 
2.79 
3.88 
5.38 
4.56 
1.90 
2.59 
3.69 
3.69 
3.66 
3.06 
SD 
1.5 
1.4 
1.9 
1.5 
1.9 
1.2 
1.3 
2.0 
2.0 
1.6 
1.3 
MEAN 
3.04 
2.79 
4.04 
5.26 
4.96 
2.00 
2.61 
3.70 
4.96 
3.70 
3.00 
SD 
1.6 
1.4 
1.9 
1.7 
2.0 
1.2 
1.3 
2.1 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
MEAN SD 
2.91 1.4 
3.91 .9 
3.46 2.1 
4.75 2.2 
4.92 1.8 
3.54 1.3 
3.83 1.3 
3.15 1.8 
4.54 1.3 
4.53 1.1 
2.69 1.4 
WHIG 
MEAN SD 
2.27 
3.25 
3.44 
5.50 
4.38 
2.44 
3.00 
3.31 
4.19 
4.00 
3.13 
1.1 
1.5 
2.2 
1.6 
1.9 
1.5 
1.5 
1.9 
1.4 
1.7 
1.4 
NDP 
MEAN SD 
4.13 
5.84 
2.27 
3.33 
2.27 
3.47 
6.27 
3.17 
6.33 
5.43 
2.38 
1.3 
1.4 
1.2 
1.8 
1.5 
1.5 
1.1 
1.9 
.7 
1.7 
1.0 
SOC. 
MEAN SD 
4.05 
5.29 
2.32 
3.33 
3.05 
3.47 
5.90 
2.27 
5.84 
5.17 
2.25 
1.3 
1.7 
1.2 
1.8 
2.0 
1.5 
1.4 
2.0 
1.4 
1.9 
1.0 
AVERAGE 
MEAN SD 
3.19 1.5 
3.77 1.8 
3.38 1.9 
4.73 1.9 
4.07 2.0 
2.66 1.5 
3.78 1.9 
3.17 1.9 
5.02 1.5 
4.27 1.7 
2.80 1.2 
APPENDIX V 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGISLATORS BY PARTY AND BLOC 
VARIABLEJ 
Tenure 
Member 
Acre 
Yreducat 
Yrserve 
Blishen 
PC 
9.12 
19.97 
50.6 
14.19 
5.67 
58.19 
TORY 
10.22 
19.30 
50.5 
13.30 
5.08 
55.85 
LIB 
10.58 
15.58 
50.7 
14.75 
5.00 
59.78 
WHIG 
8.13 
18.56 
52.2 
15.50 
6.44 
60.02 
NDP 
7.53 
17.27 
50.0 
15.87 
1.53 
57.94 
SOC. 
8.32 
17.05 
49.2 
15.84 
2.05 
60.23 
OVERALL 
9.02 
18.36 
51.5 
14.74 
4.47 
58.45 
1A11 figures except Blsihen are expressed in terms of years. For an 
explanation of the Blishen scale see Bernard R. Blishen et. al., Canadian 
Society: Sociological Perspectives. 3rd ed., (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), 
pp. 745 - 750. For the actual wording of the questions represented by these 
variables see Appendix I. 
to 
•>3 
APPENDIX VI 
PERCEPTIONS BY PARTY AND BLOC 
VARIABLE1 
Active 
Nominatn 
Conrole 
Conloyal 
Influenc 
Leaders 
PC 
2.61 
3.26 
1.39 
4.32 
3.23 
2.90 
TORY 
2.78 
2.65 
1.30 
4.35 
3.04 
2.78 
LIB 
4.50 
2.00 
1.67 
5.08 
3.33 
2.25 
WHIG 
3.56 
3.12 
1.63 
4.88 
3.50 
2.63 
NDP 
2.07 
2.60 
1.60 
4.07 
3.53 
3.60 
LEFT 
2.37 
2.79 
1.63 
4.11 
3.53 
3.42 
OVERALL 
2.82 
2.83 
1.50 
4.41 
3.33 
2.95 
•••All figures are means representing positions on a seven point scale. 
For the actual wording of the questions represented by these variables see 
Appendix I. 
APPENDIX VII 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PERCEPTIONS 
OF BLOC MEMBERS BY PARTY 
VARIABLE PC LIBERAL NDP 
TORY WHIG SOC. TORY WHIG SOC. TORY WHIG SOC. 
Tenure1 
Member1 
Age1 
Yreducat1 
Yrserve1 
Blishen2 
Seat 3 
Active 3 
Nominatn ^  
Conrole J 
9.5 
20.0 
50.0 
13.6 
5.0 
57.0 
3.3 
2.4 
2.9 
1.4 
8.3 
20.0 
52.0 
15.0 
7.3 
59.0 
4.5 
3.2 
3.8 
1.2 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
15.0 
15.0 
53.5 
11.3 
6.0 
48.9 
5.7 
5.3 
1.0 
1.0 
7.4 
15.4 
53.5 
16.0 
5.2 
59.1 
5.4 
4.3 
1.4 
2.0 
U.3 
16.3 
46.0 
15.3 
4.0 
68.8 
5.5 
3.5 
3.5 
1.8 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
mm 
7.5 
17.3 
50.0 
15.9 
1.5 
57.9 
3.9 
2.6 
2.6 
1.6 
to 
vO 
VARIABLE 
Conloyal^ 
Influenc-^ 
.3 
Leaders^ 
TORY 
4.5 
3.1 
2.9 
PC 
WHIG 
4.1 
3.7 
3.1 
TORY 
3.7 
3.0 
2.3 
LIBERAL 
WHIG 
6.6 
3.4 
1.3 
SOC. 
5.3 
3.5 
2.8 
NDP 
SOC. TORY WHIG SOC. 
4.0 
3.5 
3.6 
1Expressed in terms of years. 
o 
For an explanation of the Blishen scale see Bernard R. Blishen et. al., 
Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives. 3rd ed., (Toronto: Macmillan, 
1968), pp. 745 - 750. 
-^ All figures are means representing positions on a seven point scale. 
For the actual wording of the questions represented by these variables see 
Appendix I. 
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APPENDIX VII I 
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS 
I d e o l o g i c a l Va r i ab l e s 
YPC = 7.523XX + 1.477X2 + 1.217X3 + 1.003X4 + 4.195X5 -
1.887X6 + 0 .646x ? + 4.807Xg + 0.109XQ - 0.744X1Q + 
7 .153X l t - 0.780X1 2 - 0.454 1 3 - 2 .990X l 4 + 0.086X1 5 
- 3 . 5 2 l X l 6 - 3.626X1 ? + 0.404X1 8 + 4.357X1 9 + 
0.912X2 0 + 1.371X21 + 6.029X22 + O.256X23 - 6.423X24 
- 3 .64 lX 2 5 + 1 .8l4X 2 6 + 3.472X2 ? + 0.748X2 8 + 
0.843X2Q - 1.473X30 - 2 . l62X 3 1 - 4 . 6 l8X 3 2 + 1.976X33 
+ 5.702X3^ + 2.375X35 + 2.252X 3 6 - 73.137 
Y L I B = 3.222XX+ 0.698X2 + I.OO8X3 - 2.498X4 + 5.955X5 -
1.752X6 + 0.976X? + 4.965X3 + 0 . 0 9 5 X Q + 2.128X1Q + 
5 .874x 1 1 - 0 . 6 l i x l 2 + 1.333X13 - 3 . 4 l 6 x l 4 - 2.885X1 5 
- 3 .435X l 6 - l . 290X 1 ? - 0.140X1 8 + 7.086x1 Q + 
2.085X2 0 + 2.269X2 1 + 1.490X22 + l .736X23 - 5.l63X24 
- 0.H8X25 - 1 .86lX 2 6 + 1.025X2? + 2.862X2 8 -
1.898X2Q - 0.595X3 0 - 1.904X31 + 1.053X32 - 0.682X3 3 
+ 3.153X34 + 5.164X3 5 - 0.579X3 6 - 71.096 
YNDP = " 3.495XX - 0.160X2 + O.547X3 - 2.248Xilf + O.82IX5 
- 2.834X6 + 7.187X? + 3.229X8 + 0.386XQ + 1.671X10 
+ 2.243X1X + 0.578X1 2 + 2.224X 1 3 - 3.367XX4 -
1.903X15 - l . 2 9 7 X l 6 - 1.353X1? + 4 .523X l 8 + 0.686X1Q 
+ 0.788X2 0 - 1.578X21 + 1.090X22 + 2.172X23 -
132 
0.324X24 + 0 . l 45X 2 5 - O.56IX26 - 1.515x27 - 0.333X28 
+ 1.589X29 - 2.107X30 - o .424x 3 1 + 2.575x32 -
O.9HX33 + 5.9HX34 + 2.910X35 + 3.858X36 - 67.558 
where X^ 
X2 
x 3 
X4 
x5 
X6 
x 7 
x 8 
XQ 
X 1 0 
X l l 
X 12 
X 1 3 
X 1 4 
X 1 5 
X 16 
x 1 7 
X 18 
= 
= 
ss 
s 
= 
s 
s 
= 
= 
s 
= 
= 
s 
ss 
= 
s 
s 
s 
FORCORP 
IMMIGRTN 
ABORTION 
SEPARATE 
AUTO 
GOVTROLE 
FREEENTE 
TRADITIN 
WELFARE 
FEDERAL 
NATIONAL 
POLICE 
CENSOR 
FACTORY 
FARMERS 
UNDERDEV 
ANGLICAN 
CIC 
where X 1 9 
x 2 0 
x 2 1 
x 2 2 
x 2 3 
x 2 4 
X25 
X26 
x 2 7 
X28 
X29 
X30 
X31 
x 3 2 
X33 
X34 
x35 
x36 
= 
= 
s 
=r 
s 
s 
= 
as 
ss 
a 
a 
s 
= 
ss 
s: 
rs 
= 
I S 
PROFESSO 
ORANGE 
BRITAIN 
JEWS 
NVIETNAM 
CORPEXEC 
FRCEDNS 
USTATES 
EMPIRE 
ACTION 
WOMENS 
UNION 
MONARCHY 
CMA 
POLLUTIN 
DEVELOPE 
OMA 
WELFRE 
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Ypc = 1.593X1 + 0.385X2 + O.444X3 - O.OO6X4 + O.037X5 
+ 0.014X6 
YLIB" 2» x97Xi + 0.382X2 + O.46OX3 + O.OI8X4 + O.036X5 
+ 0.013X6 
YNDP= 1.347X1 + 0.360X2 = O.377X3 + 0.074X4 + O.O78X5 
+ 0.015X6 
where Xi «* SAFE ( r e l a t i v e s a f e n e s s of s e a t on a seven 
point scale) 
X2 » URBAN (percentage of riding that is urban) 
X3 =s FARMERS (percentage of riding that is composed 
of farmers) 
X4 = WORKERS (percentage of riding that is composed 
of Industrial workers) 
X5 = CATHOLIC (percentage of riding that is 
populated by Roman Catholics) 
X6 - DISTANCE (number of miles that riding is 
from Queen's Park) 
APPENDIX IX 
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ORDER OF ENTRY OF VARIABLES, 
STEP-WISE DISCRIMINATION 
Distinguishing Parties — All Ideological Variables 
VARIABLE 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Freeente 
Auto 
Separate 
ForCorp 
Federal 
National 
Professo 
CMA 
CIC 
Develope 
Womens 
Action 
Union 
Welfre 
Britain 
FrCdns 
Jews 
Govtrole 
Pollutin 
U-STATISTIC 
.3336 
.1965 
.1267 
.0899 
.0658 
.0541 
.0447 
.0376 
.0301 
.0301 
.0274 
.0248 
.0229 
.0207 
.0188 
.0175 
.0142 
.0133 
.0128 
Distinguishing Parties 
Freeente 
Auto 
Separate 
National 
CMA 
Britain 
Factory 
CorpExec 
FrCdns 
.3336 
.1965 
.1267 
.1057 
.0938 
.0879 
.0830 
.0788 
.0741 
Distinguishing Parties — 
Freeente 
Auto 
ForCorp 
.3336 
.1965 
.1380 
VARIABLE U-
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
3S* 36. 
not 
37. 
UStates 
Orange 
0MA 
NVietnam 
Empire 
CorpExec 
Censor 
Anglican 
Farmers 
Immigrtn 
Police 
Underdev 
Traditln 
Monarchy 
Abortion 
Factory 
Welfare 
included -
Lions 
— Tory Variables 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Jews 
Anglican 
Empire 
UStates 
Monarchy 
Farmers 
OMA 
Orange 
TradItin 
•STATIS' 
.0120 
.0113 
.0109 
.0101 
.0097 
.0093 
.0090 
.0086 
.0079 
.0077 
.0076 
.0074 
.0073 
.0072 
.0071 
.0071 
.0071 
.0656 
.0627 
.0591 
.0573 
.0563 
.0555 
.0545 
.0543 
.0543 
Socialist Variables 
4. 
5. 
6. 
National 
Professo 
CMA 
.1100 
.093? 
.0784 
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VARIABLE 
7. CIC 
8. Pollutin 
9. NVietnam 
10. Govtrole 
11. Underdev 
12. Union 
13. Immlgrtn 
U-STATISTIC 
.0658 
.0598 
.0535 
.0496 
.0475 
.0461 
.0443 
VARIABLE U-STATISTIC 
14. FrCdns 
15. Jews 
16. Action 
17. Womens 
18. Welfare 
19. Welfre 
20. Factory 
Distinguishing Parties — Whig Variables 
1. Freeente 
2. ForCorp 
3. CMA 
4. Develope 
5. UStates 
6. Abortion 
.3336 
.2516 
.1962 
.1796 
.1722 
.1669 
Distinguishing Parties 
1. Active 
2. Yrserve 
3. Leaders 
4. Influenc 
5. Nominatn 
6. Blishen 
Distinguishing 
1. Workers 
2. Seat 
3. Farmers 
.8414 
.7055 
.5950 
.5636 
.5274 
.5150 
Parties — 
.7474 
.6365 
.5659 
7. Censor 
8. Empire 
9. OMA 
10. CorpExec 
11. Orange 
.0428 
.0408 
.0393 
.0363 
.0358 
.0356 
.0351 
.1588 
.1534 
.1497 
.1477 
.1474 
— Personal Characteristics 
7. Tenure 
8. Member 
9. Conrole 
10. Birth 
11. Conloyal 
12. Yreducat 
.4856 
.4615 
.4411 
.4282 
.4121 
.4091 
Constituency Characteristcs 
4. Catholic 
5. Distance 
6. Urban 
.5297 
.5112 
.5026 
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